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ARTICLES




The Supreme Court has been creating clear statement rules faster
than commentators can keep track of them. Clear statement rules now
govern statutory interpretation questions involving congressional
regulation of core state functions,' the abrogation of state Eleventh
Amendment immunity,2 the extraterritorial effect of a statute,3
congressional interference with presidential powers respecting foreign
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., Indiana
University, 1982; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1986. I am grateful for the
ideas and criticisms shared by Angela Carmella, John Gibbons, Abner Greene, Ed
Hartnett, Harold Krent, John McGinnis, Mike Paulsen, Marc Poirier, Lowell Sturgill, and
my wife, Lisa. Steve Skinner provided invaluable research assistance. Part of this article
is based on a presentation made at the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference in Denver,
Colorado, on August 19, 1994. 1 have also drawn from my experience at the United
States Department of Justice, where I represented the federal government in a number of
the environmental cases discussed below. The views expressed here are my own, and not
necessarily those of the federal government.
1. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1764-65 (1994);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991). But see County of Suffolk v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1306-08 (2d Cir. 1990) (dubious effort to find the
clear statement rule inapplicable to the extension of RICO to a public utility).
2. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991);
id. at 205-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 786 (1991); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S.
96 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
For a sympathetic account of the clear statement rules established by these cases and by
the cases cited supra note 1, see Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and
Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1959 (1994).
3. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). But see
Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1994) (EEOC did not
establish a clear statement rule); Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (EEOC merely "reaffirmed the general presumption against the
extraterritorial application of statutes").
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
affairs and national security,4 and waivers of the federal government's
sovereign immunity.' Judges have proposed (or commentators have
identified) other clear statement rules for the retroactive application of
statutes,6 repeals by implication,7 statutes significantly affecting the
balance between Congress and the President,8 the diminishment of Indian
reservations,9 the conveyance of federal public lands to private parties, 0
and a number of other actions."1
These rules are powerful. At their strongest, clear statement rules
treat all statutes as maintaining the status quo unless Congress clearly
states its contrary intention in the text of the statute. Because clear
statement rules "foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guides of
interpretation,"12 they eliminate any need-or opportunity-to glean
evidence from the structure, purpose, or history of a statute to inform a
determination about congressional intent. But the Court has vacillated
regarding precisely what Congress must do to satisfy clear statement
rules. Sometimes broad general language suffices; sometimes only a
statement targeted at a specific problem is demanded. Sometimes the
Court considers the text alone; sometimes it looks at other evidence of
congressional intent. The Court has not been consistent, nor has it
explained its different approaches; thus, it is little wonder that some
4. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988); United States v.
Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
5. See infra part ll.B.
6. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1522 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court for applying a rule that would have
permitted a finding of the clear statement of retroactivity in the legislative history).
7. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991)
(citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
8. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
9. See Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 971 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that precedent requires "clear and unequivocal evidence of congressional intent"
to diminish an Indian reservation).
10. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1987).
11. For lists of clear statement rules and other canons of statutory interpretation
applied by the Court, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 323-33 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-
108 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium]; William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598-629 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge
& Frickey, Clear Statement]; David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927-41 & nn.98-100 (1992).
12. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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commentators now distinguish between ordinary clear statement rules and
"super-strong" clear statement rules. 3
Whatever their exact strength, the Court has relied on clear statement
rules to serve the same purposes. The Court finds such rules necessary
for "the protection of weighty and constant values, be they constitutional,
or otherwise." 4 Ideally, this approach benefits both Congress and the
courts. Congress knows which rules the courts will follow when they
interpret a statute, and the courts know that Congress has reached a
careful decision respecting an important public value.
But it does not always work that way. The Court's increased
reliance on clear statement rules in statutory interpretation has received
a generally unfavorable reaction. Critics of the Court's reliance on clear
statement rules have questioned the Court's power to establish such rules
and the Court's choice of which values to protect. 5 The Court has
contributed to this uneasiness by its failure to explain when a clear
statement rule governs a particular interpretive question.
I share many of the concerns that others have voiced, but for
different reasons. Most of the academic critics of the Court's recent
establishment of clear statement rules are generally dissatisfied with the
Court's approach to statutory interpretation. The Court has been
originalist at a time when dynamic theories are all the rage. I am
generally supportive of many aspects of the Court's originalist
approach,16 but I share the skepticism about clear statement rules. I am
especially concerned about the strongest clear statement rules-that require
specifically targeted statutory language and refuse to consider other
indicia of legislative intent. Two originalist concerns animate my
reaction: the Constitution does not entrust the judiciary with the
responsibility for identifying which policy values merit greatest
protection, and interpretive rules that Congress cannot satisfy when
drafting a statute conflict with legislative supremacy.
13. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
14. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (citations
omitted); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2633 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("our jurisprudence abounds
with rules of 'plain statement,' 'clear statement,' and 'narrow construction' designed
variously to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of Congress's intent, extraordinary
constitutional powers are not invoked, or important constitutional protections eliminated,
or seemingly inequitable doctrines applied" (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989))). See infra text accompanying notes 156-60.
15. See infra notes 157-65, 166-79 and accompanying text.
16. For a more thorough explanation of my attitude toward the Court's recent
statutory interpretation decisions, see John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic
Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)).
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The recent evolution of a clear statement rule for the interpretation
of waivers of federal sovereign immunity illustrates these points. The
federal government has won five of the last seven Supreme Court cases
involving the sovereign immunity of the United States. 17 The Court has
gone much further than simply rule for the government in these cases.
In consecutive decisions in Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,18 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.," and United States
Department of Energy v. Ohio,' the Court has held that the statutory
purpose, the legislative history, or a plausible reading of an ambiguous
statute carries no weight in the sovereign immunity inquiry if the text of
a statute does not plainly waive federal sovereign immunity from the
claim presented in the case." These cases'implicitly yielded another
clear statement rule.
The Court has not explained why it created such a strong clear
statement rule for waivers of federal sovereign immunity. None of the
Court's opinions have defended sovereign immunity or explained the
apparently increased need to protect the federal government from suit.
The Court has not even seen it necessary to respond to Justice Stevens,
who alone voted against the government in all seven cases. 2 In each
case, and in an article entitled Is Justice Irrelevant?,' Justice Stevens
has attacked the contemporary need for sovereign immunity and the
17. The federal government prevailed in United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893
(1993); Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993); United States Dep't of Energy
v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992);
and Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991). The government then lost in United States
v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995) and FDIC v. Meyers, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994). I
discuss each case infra part II.B.
18. 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
19. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
20. 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
21. See infra part II.B.1-3.
22. See United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611, 1614 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
opinion for the Court joined by Stevens, J.); FDIC v. Meyers, 114 S. Ct. 996, 999 (1994)
(Thomas, J., opinion for the Court joined by Stevens, J.); United States v. Idaho, 113 S.
Ct. 1893, 1898 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Smith v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Ohio, 503 U.S. at 629 (White, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting); Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 139 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens had criticized sovereign immunity before. See United States v. Dalm, 494
U.S. 596, 622 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,
578 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only two other justices to dissent in the most
cases won by the government were Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Ohio, Nordic
Village, and Ardestani, and Justice White, who dissented in Ohio.
23. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121 (1993).
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Court's zeal to protect it. Almost all of the academic commentators agree
with Justice Stevens,' but the Court remains unmoved. Perhaps there
is something about being a law professor that evokes hostility to sovereign
immunity: Professor Scalia had a much different attitude toward sovereign
immunity than Justice Scalia (at least until 1995).'5
The Court's embrace of a new approach to construing statutes that
waive sovereign immunity affords a useful opportunity to examine the
way in which and the reasons why the Court has increasingly turned
toward clear statement rules to solve problems of statutory interpretation.
Part II of this Article shows how the Court's latest federal sovereign
immunity decisions represent a departure from the often conflicting
jurisprudence that previously marked the field. The path has not been
clear, and the lower courts have struggled to follow it, but the Supreme
Court has decided sovereign immunity cases differently since 1991 than
it did previously. Part III places the new sovereign immunity decisions
in the context of other recent decisions announcing clear statement rules
and the Supreme Court's general statutory interpretation decisions. The
standard reaction to the new sovereign immunity decisions is that they are
yet another example of the error in the Court's general approach to
statutory interpretation. My reaction is different. The sovereign
immunity decisions deserve reconsideration precisely because they depart
from the Court's general approach. In most contexts, the Court asks
"what does this statute mean?" Clear statement rules, by contrast, ask
"does this statute mean x?" The premise of clear statement rules is that
x should be treated in a special fashion.
What is missing, however, is a means of identifying which values
deserve such treatment and when it is appropriate for the Court to
24. "No scholar, so far as can be ascertained, has had a good word for sovereign
immunity for many years." Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal
Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 389, 392 (1970). And
"nearly every commentator who considers the subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity must go." KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 25.01, at 435-36 (1958). More recently, Judge Selya observed that "the
scholarly community has been overwhelmingly hostile to the doctrine." United States v.
Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 762 n.7 (1st Cir. 1994). The general criticisms of sovereign
immunity are listed infra part III.A.1. The most notable exception is the articulate
defense of sovereign immunity offered in Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign
Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (1992), which I discuss at length below. See infra
part II.A.2.
25. Compare Antonin Scalia, Sovereign nimnunity and Nonstatutory Review of
Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 867 (1970) and Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1620 (Scalia, J., concurring) with Nordic
Village, 503 U.S. at 32-38 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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unilaterally provide heightened protection to those values. In Part III, I
propose two questions to evaluate the need for clear statement rules.
First, are the values at stake worthy of the added protection provided by
the requirement that the legislature speak to the issue with the utmost
clarity? I conclude that the only values deserving of such protection are
those constitutional commands that the Court has decided not to fully
enforce through judicial review. Second, can Congress easily provide the
requisite clear statement when it considers a subject for the first time? If
not, then I conclude a clear statement rule fails because it conflicts with
legislative supremacy.
Asking these questions in the context of waivers of federal sovereign
immunity, particularly in light of the lessons of environmental law, I
determine that the Court's new clear statement rule for federal sovereign
immunity falls short of the goals for which clear statement rules are
designed. The separation of powers values implicit in sovereign
immunity are similar to constitutional values protected by other clear
statement rules, although it is questionable whether the Court fails to fully
enforce the constitutional separation of powers. But while it is easy for
Congress to write a provision that waives sovereign immunity generally,
it is hard for Congress to write a provision that specifies the scope of a
waiver of sovereign immunity. The difficulty Congress experiences in
satisfying a clear statement rule is intensified in the sovereign immunity
context, where Congress has displayed an increased willingness to waive
the federal government's immunity. As a result, the clear statement rule
threatens legislative supremacy. The case for a clear statement rule for
interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity thus fails for a simple reason:
the justification for a clear statement rule must be clear; in sovereign
immunity cases, it is not.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE
Most accounts trace the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the
English notion that "the king can do no wrong."26 The Framers of our
Constitution knew better, and the Constitution itself is silent respecting
the immunity of the federal government from suit. 7 Nonetheless, the
26. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238-39. For lists of sources
questioning the development of the English law itself, see Joseph D. Block, Suits Against
Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 n.2
(1946); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-96 & n.24 (1983).
27. Alexander Hamilton asserted that "[it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." THE FEDERALIST No.
81. The few efforts to give the doctrine a textual anchor in the Constitution locate it in
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Supreme Court recognized the doctrine as early as 1821 and has
continued to do so ever since.' It is also well established that Congress
can waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government.' What
remained unclear, at least until 1991, was precisely what Congress had
to say in order to waive sovereign immunity.
the Supremacy Clause. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDOE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 653
n.2 (2d ed. 1995); Mike Rothmel, Note, When Will the Federal Government Waive the
Sovereign Immunity Defense and Dispose of its Violations Properly?, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 581, 582 n.7 (1989); J.B. Wolverton, Note, Sovereign Immunity and National
Priorities: Enforcing Federal Facilities' Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 565, 577 (1991). Most writers simply attribute sovereign
immunity to the constitutional structure. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 24, at 1534. Since
1798, the Constitution has addressed the immunity of states from suit. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 608-
09, 621-23 (describing the evolution of the clear statement rule for waivers of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
28. See Cohens v. Virginia, 16 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 411-12 (1821) (Marshall,
C.J.) ("The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted
against the United States."). The leading nineteenth century case is United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882), where the heirs of General Robert E. Lee successfully sued the
federal government for seizing the family's Arlington, Virginia, estate after the Battle of
Gettysburg for use as a national cemetery. The Court admitted that the principle of
sovereign immunity "has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has
always been treated as an established doctrine." Id. at 207. For general discussions of
the history of sovereign immunity, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,435-45
(1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1108-29 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART
& WECHSLER]; Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1
(1924); Cramton, supra note 24, at 396-417; Scalia, supra note 25, at 869-70.
29. The United States may be sued only if it has consented to be sued. See
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986); Block v. North Dakota, 461
U.S. 273, 280 (1983); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("As the United States are not suable at common right, the party who
institutes such suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of congress, or the
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it."). Judge Selya has explained that the English
tradition
could not be transplanted root and branch into a system where sovereignty was
diffused both vertically (by federalism) and horizontally (by the separation of
powers). Accordingly, in regard to the federal government, the law adapted
the doctrine in such a way that Congress inherited the king's sovereign role
of granting consent to be sued.
United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 761-62 (1st Cir. 1994). Conversely, the President
cannot waive sovereign immunity. See, e.g., id. at 762; Susan L. Smith, Shields for the
King's Men: Official Immunity and Other Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Federal
Officials for Environmental Crimes, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 19 & n.53 (1991);
Charles W. Tucker, Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and Local Environmental
Regulations, 35 NAVAL L. REV. 87, 98 (1986).
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A. The Law Before 1991
The Supreme Court's sovereign immunity decisions before 1991
offered something for everyone. One line of cases established two rules
of strict construction for waivers of sovereign immunity. The first rule
governed the initial determination of whether a statute authorized any
waiver of sovereign immunity. A waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."' The second rule
governed the interpretation of statutes that concededly waived sovereign
immunity in some instances. Even when Congress enacts a statute that
waives the sovereign immunity of the United States in some
circumstances, such a statute must be construed narrowly and not
enlarged beyond what its language requires. 1 Any conditions on a
waiver must be strictly observed, and no exceptions to those conditions
may be implied.32 There is a further caution against subjecting the
federal government to monetary claims, even under statutes which
30. See, e.g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990);
United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990); Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v.
Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 734 (1982); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980);
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1,
4 (1969). This principle first appeared in The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 19 (1869)
("the doctrine is well established that no suit can be sustained in which the United States
is made an original defendant ... without some act of Congress expressly authorizing it
to be done") (emphasis added), and was repeated in several ensuing cases. See United
States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 659 (1931); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272
U.S. 675, 686 (1926); Price v. United States & Osage Indians, 174 U.S. 373, 375-76
(1899).. For a general discussion of the Court's interpretation of waivers of sovereign
immunity, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 28, at 1157-58; see also Borchard, supra
note 28, at 9-13.
31. See, e.g., Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318-19; Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S.
680, 685-86 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951); United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941). The rule appears to have originated in
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894), where the Court stated that
"[b]eyond the letter of such consent, the courts may not go, no matter how beneficial they
may deem or in fact might be in their possession of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities
of the Government." Price was even more forceful:
we cannot go beyond the language of the statute and impose a liability which
the Government has not declared its willingness to assume. . . .The
Government is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its liability in
suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing
it.
174 U.S. at 375-76.
32. See, e.g., Irwin, 498 U.S. at 97 (White, J., concurring); Block, 461 U.S. at
287; Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.
111, 117-18 (1979); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); Sherwood, 312
U.S. at 590.
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generally waive sovereign immunity.33 A waiver must be read according
to this second rule of strict construction even if it is contained in a
remedial statute.'
Another line of cases instructed that waivers of sovereign immunity
must be "liberally construed."35 These cases, which interpreted waivers
in New Deal legislation, characterized the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as "disfavored."' The Court also developed an entirely different
approach to clauses authorizing a federal instrumentality to "sue and be
sued." There, rather than reading the statutory language narrowly and
requiring clear proof that Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity
in each particular circumstance, the Court adopted the opposite
presumption, holding that a waiver exists absent a special showing to the
contrary." But the general liberal construction rule deflated into a
principle of neutrality after the 1940s. In United States v. Kubrick,38 for
example, the Court said that "we should not take it upon ourselves to
33. Judge Selya describes this as the "secondary principle" of sovereign
immunity. Horn, 29 F.3d at 761. It applies to monetary penalties. See United States
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 620-27 (1992); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Ault, 256
U.S. 554, 563-65 (1921). It also applies to attorney's fees, see Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S.
at 685; the garnishment of the wages of federal employees, see Automatic Sprinkler Corp.
v. Darla Envtl. Specialists, Inc., 53 F.3d 181, 181-82 (7th Cir. 1995); and interest on
otherwise authorized monetary awards, see Shaw, 478 U.S. at 314.
34. See, e.g., Irwin, 498 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring); Shaw, 478 U.S. at
316-18; FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 850 (3d Cir.
1994) (en bane) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting); Monark Boat Co. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1322,
1327 (8th Cir. 1983).
35. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940); Federal Housing
Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin.
Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939); see also Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 153
N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The exemption of the sovereign from suit
involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor
by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.").
36. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 723
(1949) (Frankfilrter, J., dissenting); Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580
(1943); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 84 (1941); Burr,
309 U.S. at 245.
37. See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1988); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
USPS, 467 U.S. 512, 517-18 (1984); Burr, 309 U.S. at 244-46; see also International
Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 86 n.8
(1991) (citing Burr for the proposition that agencies "authorized to 'sue and be sued' are
presumed to have fully waived immunity"). The Court has never recognized that the
justification for a liberal reading of "sue and be sued" clauses-the amenability to suit of
corporate entities-may have broader ramifications given the similar corporate form of
many of the original American colonies. See Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Gibbons, supra note 26, at 1896-99.
38. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
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extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended. Neither,
however, should we assume to narrow the waiver that Congress
intended." 39 Toward that end, the Court frequently looked at the
legislative history and statutory purpose to see if they supported a
waiver.' And the Court sometimes found a waiver in ambiguous
statutory language.
B. The Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Things began to change in 1991. In three consecutive decisions, the
Court refused to consider the purpose of a statutory waiver, it refused to
consider the legislative history of another provision, and it concluded that
the existence of different possible constructions of a third provision
doomed the case for a waiver. The next two decisions did not break any
new ground, but they did not step backward either. The sixth decision
involved a "sue and be sued" clause, a kind of waiver provision that the
Court has long treated as unique. The final decision purported to follow
the same rule announced in the first three decisions, but it applied the rule
to find a waiver where the dissenters saw none in the text. I describe
each decision in some detail, both to show the evolution of the Court's
test and to illustrate some of the practical consequences of using a clear
statement rule to decide questions of sovereign immunity.
39. Id. at 117-18; see also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69
(1955). In both cases the Court was reading the waiver of sovereign immunity in the
Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), which is discussed infra part II.B.4 and part II.B.6.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212-16 (1983) (reviewing
the legislative history to determine the scope of the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign
immunity for suits against the government arising from liability in contract); Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167, 188-90 (1976) (examining legislative history of the Clean Air Act
in deciding scope of waiver of sovereign immunity); Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 69
(relying on the broad purposes of the FTCA to allow the United States to be sued for the
negligent operation of a lighthouse); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543,
549-50 (1951) (relying on the broad congressional purpose of the FTCA to extend the
waiver to third-party claims for contribution as a joint tortfeasor); Canadian Aviator, Ltd.
v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1945) (relying on legislative history as an
expression of congressional intent to provide a broad waiver of immunity in the Public
Vessels Act).
Other cases examined legislative history but concluded that it did not support a
waiver. See, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606-09 (1986); United States
v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 810-11 (1984); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,
288-89 (1983). Justice O'Connor, who joined all of the recent opinions establishing a
clear statement rule and wrote the Ardestani opinion, earlier remarked that "[tihe Court
must still consider all indicia of congressional intent." Id. at 294 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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1. ARDESTANJ AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF STATUTORY PURPOSE
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires "[an agency that
conducts an adversary adjudication" to award attorney's fees and expenses
to prevailing parties in most instances.4 An "adversary adjudication"
is "an adjudication under section 554 of [the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)] in which the position of the United States is represented by
counsel or otherwise."42 Rafeh-Rafie Ardestani prevailed before the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in an administrative
deportation proceeding, and she sought to recover attorney's fees. In
Ardestani v. INS,'' however, the Court ruled six to two that an INS
deportation proceeding is not "an adjudication under section 554."
Ardestani principally relied on the functional argument that INS
deportation proceedings fall "under section 554" of the APA because both
types of proceedings are similar." The Court looked at the statute's text
instead of its purpose. The statutory term "an adjudication under section
554," said Justice O'Connor, unambiguously refers to proceedings
"'subject to' or 'governed by' section 554." 4  The Court used two
different, and sometimes conflicting, interpretive frameworks in reaching
this conclusion. At first, the Court repeated its standard rule of statutory
construction: statutory text is strongly presumed to express congressional
intent except in exceptional circumstances where the legislative history (or
other sources) reveal a contrary intent.' The legislative history lacked
any evidence of legislative intent inconsistent with plain meaning of the
statutory text. But the Court then judged the question in light of a second
interpretive principle: waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly
construed in favor of the government.47 Applying that principle, the
41. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1994).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1994).
43. 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
44. Id. at 134. Ardestani noted that INS proceedings and APA adjudications are
"required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." Before addressing that argument, and relying on its earlier decision in
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), the Court first held that the INS deportation
proceedings were governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, not the APA.
Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 134.
45. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 135-36. For different views of the Court's consistency in following this
approach, compare Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S. CT. REV. 231 (arguing that the Court has
increasingly relied on a plain meaning approach) with Philip P. Frickey, From the Big
Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 241 (1992) (arguing that the Court has been inconsistent).
47. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 137 (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
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Court candidly acknowledged that the purposes of the EAJA would be
served by the liberal interpretation advanced by Ardestani, yet the Court
considered itself constrained by "the plain language of the statute, coupled
with the strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity.""
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. They took
issue with the Court's characterization of the statutory language as
unambiguous and with its reliance on the rule of strictly construing
waivers of sovereign immunity.49 But their primary grievance concerned
the Court's refusal to even try to articulate any way in which the ruling
furthered the purposes of the EAJA. Justice Blackmun recounted those
purposes at length, as demonstrated by the statutory text and the
legislative history, and concluded that they supported a waiver.'
Ardestani thus indicated that the Court would look only at the plain
language of the statute to find a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute became irrelevant if that
purpose was not expressed in the statutory text. That conclusion irritated
the dissenters, but the Court did not see fit to respond.
2. NoRDiC VILLAGE AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
[e]xcept as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section
and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity-(1)
a provision of this title that contains 'creditor,' 'entity,' or
'governmental unit' applies to governmental units; and (2) a
determination by the court of an issue arising under such a
provision binds governmental units.5'
Four months after Nordic Village, Inc. filed for bankruptcy, one of the
company's officers used $20,000 of the company's funds to satisfy his
individual tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The
310, 318 (1986), and Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983)). The
Court cited the Kubrick principle that waivers should not be read too narrowly, see supra
note 32 and accompanying text, but the Court then distinguished Kubrick as a case in
which Congress had waived sovereign immunity over an entire subject matter. The
EAJA, by contrast, contains a limited waiver that only extends to proceedings that fall
'under section 554" of the APA. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 137. The Court's analysis begs
the question of how broadly one defines the "subject matter" covered by a waiver of
sovereign immunity.
48. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 138.
49. Id. at 139-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 141-50.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1994).
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bankruptcy trustee sought to recover that money, but the IRS refused to
pay. In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,52 the Court ruled seven
to two that sovereign immunity barred the trustee's suit against the
government.
Justice Scalia's opinion consciously sought to clarify the Court's
prior conflicting statements regarding waivers of sovereign immunity.
"[Tihe traditional principle," he explained, was that "the Government's
consent to be sued 'must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,'
and not 'enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires.'" 53 He
distinguished the cases relied on by the bankruptcy trustee in support of
a generally liberal construction of waivers of sovereign immunity because
they involved "'the sweeping language' of the Federal Tort Claims Act"
or "equally broad 'sue and be sued' clauses" which provided clear
congressional intent to narrowly construe the exceptions to the waivers
instead of the waivers themselves.'
Section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code failed the Court's test. The
provision waived sovereign immunity in some instances, but it did not
unambiguously waive sovereign immunity from monetary claims. Section
106(c) thus stood in contrast to its preceding subsections (a) and (b),
which plainly waived sovereign immunity from certain monetary
claims.55 The Court propounded two possible interpretations of section
106(c) that would permit declaratory and injunctive, but not monetary,
relief.' The mere existence of such "plausible" interpretations meant
that, notwithstanding the bankruptcy trustee's interpretation favoring
monetary relief, the statute was ambiguous.
Once the Court found that the text of section 106(c) did not
unambiguously waive sovereign immunity, it added that "legislative
history has no bearing on the ambiguity point."8 Justice Scalia
explained that "the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of sovereign
immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text. If clarity
52. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
53. Id. at 34 (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951), and
Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983), which in turn quoted Eastern
Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927)).
54. Id. at 34 (quoting United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547
(1951)). Justice Scalia added that a statutory provision may work an extensive waiver of
sovereign immunity when it is "consistent with Congress's clear intent," id., but his
reaffirmation of the strict construction rule indicates that he thought such cases were the
exception, not the rule.
55. Id. at 34.
56. Id. at 35-36.




does not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a committee report.""
The Court thus refused to address the arguments based on legislative
history.
Justice Stevens strongly objected to the Court's reading of section
106(c) as inconsistent with its natural meaning and its legislative intent.'
He found the Court's "love affair with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity" even more objectionable.61 He derided the doctrine as
"nothing but a judge-made rule" with little modern justification that posed
a "persistent threat to the impartial administration of justice."62 He also
suggested that Congress shared his view.' Finally, taking particular
issue with the Court's refusal to consider the legislative history, he wrote:
Surely the interest in requiring the Congress to draft its
legislation with greater clarity or precision does not justify a
refusal to make a good faith effort to ascertain the actual
meaning of the message it tried to convey in a statutory
provision that is already on the books. The Court's stibborn
insistence on "clear statements" burdens the Congress with
unnecessary reenactment of provisions that were already plain
enough when read literally. The cost to litigants, to the
legislature, and to the public at large, of this sort of judicial
lawmaking is substantial and unfortunate. Its impact on
individual citizens engaged in litigation against the sovereign is
tragic. The fact that Congress has ample power to correct the
Court's fortunate error does not justify this refusal to obey its
command."
Again, however, the Court did not respond to Justice Stevens.
Nordic Village thus built upon Ardestani: inquiries into the legislative
history in Nordic Village were no more permissible then the inquiry into
the statutory purpose barred in Ardestani. If a waiver exists, it must be
found in the text of the statute.
59. Id.
60. Justice Stevens argued that the United States is a "governmental unit," that
the provision relied upon by the bankruptcy trustee "applies" to the United States
"notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity," and thus the federal government
was bound by the bankruptcy court's adverse determination. Id. at 40 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
61. Id. at 42.
62. id. at 42-43.
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 45-46 (footnote omitted).
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3. OHIO AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF STATUTORY AMBIGUITY
The next case presented three possible statutory sources for a waiver
of sovereign immunity. The State of Ohio sued the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) for violations of the Clean Water Act, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and state laws during the course
of operating a uranium-processing plant in Fernald, Ohio. The DOE
admitted its liability for violating the laws, but it argued that it retained
sovereign immunity from the state's claim for civil penalties. United
States Department of Energy v. Ohio' held six to three that none of the
provisions of the Clean Water Act or RCRA waive the sovereign
immunity of federal agencies from civil penalties for violations of state or
federal water pollution laws. The state first cited the nearly identical
citizen suit provisions of section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act' and
section 7002(a) of RCRA.67 The Clean Water Act citizen suit provision
states that
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf..
. against any person (including ... the United States...) who
is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation .. . .The district courts shall have jurisdiction...
to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an
order ...as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate
civil penalties under [section 309(d)]."
The state reasoned that the incorporation of the civil penalties sections of
each statute within their citizen suit provisions displayed a congressional
intent to subject federal instrumentalities to civil penalties. Justice Souter,
however, observed that the civil penalties provisions are applicable only
to "persons," and neither act generally defines "person" to include the
United States.' Accordingly, the Court held that while the United
65. 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). Section 309(d), in turn, describes when and
what civil penalties are appropriate. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994).
69. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 619; see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994) and 42 U.S.C. §§
6928(a), (g) (1994) (civil penalty provisions applicable to "persons"); 33 U.S.C. §
1362(5) (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1994) (defining "persons").
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States is a "person" subject to a citizen suit, the United States is not a
"person" from which civil penalties may be collected.'
The state next relied on the federal facility provision of section
313(a) of the Clean Water Act, which provides:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1)
having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged
in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge
or runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee
thereof in the performance of his official duties, shall be subject
to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water
pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity including the payment of reasonable
service charges .... [Tihe United States shall be liable only for
those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a
State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such
court.7
The state claimed that a civil penalty is a "sanction" within the meaning
of section 313(a), but the Court concluded that "Congress was using
'sanction' in its coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive fines" such
as civil penalties.' The state also claimed that a civil penalty imposed
for a violation of a state law permit program approved by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is one "arising under Federal
law" within the meaning of section 313(a). Again, the Court disagreed.
The Court held that a fine for violating a state statute, even a state statute
approved by a federal agency, is not a fine "arising under Federal
law."' This left the Court uncertain of the meaning of "a seemingly
expansive phrase like 'civil penalties arising under federal law.'" Without
citing the canon that statutes should be read to avoid rendering any
language superfluous,74 the Court resolved the issue by relying on the
rule that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be construed
narrowly-and ambiguous statutory language cannot support a waiver.75
70. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 617-18.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994).
72. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 623.
73. ld.
74. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994).
75. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 625-26.
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The state's last argument relied on the federal facilities provision of
section 6001 of RCRA,76 which was nearly identical to section 313(a)
of the Clean Water Act. The state claimed that the phrase "all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements" encompassed civil penalties.
The Court, however, adopted the Tenth Circuit's reading of "all ...
requirements" to include "'substantive standards and the means for
implementing those standards, but excluding punitive measures.'" '
Thus, the Court held that neither the Clean Water Act nor RCRA waives
the sovereign immunity of federal agencies from civil penalties.
Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
accused the Court of "adopting 'an unduly restrictive interpretation' of
both statutes and writing the waivers out of existence. "7' He believed
that the plain language of the waivers satisfied the Court's own test.'7
The crucial question for Justice White was whether the desired civil
penalties arose under federal law as required by the Clean Water Act, and
he concluded that the structure and plain language of the statute
demonstrated that they did.'
Ohio completed the Court's move to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity only in clear statutory text. While Ardestani and Nordic Village
blocked the examination of the purpose and legislative history of the
statute respectively, Ohio insisted that the statutory text itself must be
clear. The existence of plausible alternative readings of the statute meant
that the language was unclear, which meant that the statute was
ambiguous, which meant that no waiver of sovereign immunity would be
found.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994).
77. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903
F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990)).
78. Id. at 630 (quoting Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215,
222 (1945)).
79. Justice White wrote that "[i]t is impossible to fathom a clearer statement that
the United States may be sued and found liable for civil penalties," id. at 632, and that
the Court failed to "read the [Clean Water Act] as Congress wrote it." Id. at 635.
Moreover, "[tihe job of this Court is to determine what a statute says, not whether it
could have been drafted more artfully." Id. at 636.
80. Id. at 636. Likewise, while Justice White agreed with the Court that the
RCRA federal facilities provision did not work an unambiguous waiver, he thought that
the RCRA citizen suit provision did achieve such a waiver. Id.
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4. SMrTH AND THE SHRINKING FTCA WAIVER
The Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) generally waives the
sovereign immunity of the federal government from tort suits. However,
it does not apply to "[any claim arising in a foreign country.""' John
Emmett Smith died while on a hike at the McMurdo Station in Antarctica,
and his widow sued the federal government in federal district court in her
home state of Oregon alleging that the government negligently failed to
warn of the dangers outside the hiking path. In Smith v. United States,"
the Court held eight to one that the FTCA did not waive the government's
sovereign immunity because Antarctica is a "foreign country" within the
meaning of the exception.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion acknowledged that the Court's
prior cases contained conflicting statements about how the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the FTCA should be construed.' Dicta in Nordic
Village described the FTCA waiver as "sweeping,"" but the Court now
reaffirmed the principle first stated in Kubrick that the waiver should
neither be read too broadly nor too narrowly." The Court then
identified three reasons why the foreign country exception to the waiver
should be read to include Antarctica-and why the Congress that enacted
the FTCA would have reached the same result."
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994). The general FTCA waiver extends to
claims against the United States ... for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994). For an overview of the FTCA, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 28, at 1147-53.
82. 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993).
83. Id. at 1182-83 (citing cases).
84. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992).
85. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1183 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,
117-18 (1979)). Justice White used this language in his dissent in United States Dep't of
Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 630 (1992).
86. The Court cited dictionary definitions of "country" (the FTCA itself does not
define the term) and expressed its belief that Antarctica is a "country" within the ordinary
meaning of the term. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1181. It next cited the reference in § 1346(b)
of the FTCA to government liability "in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred" as "more than a choice-of-law provision: it delineates the scope
of the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. at 1182. For, the Court feared,
the FTCA would direct the court to apply "the law of a place that has no law" if
Antarctica were within the scope of the FTCA waiver. Id. And the Court relied on the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes. Id. at 1183.
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This time Justice Stevens dissented alone. He forwarded an
altogether different general approach to interpreting the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the FTCA. Indeed, describing the waiver as
"broad" and "sweeping," 87 Justice Stevens favored a presumption that
a waiver exists and that exceptions to a waiver should be read
narrowly." He also explained at length the errors he perceived in the
Court's understanding of the statutory structure.'
Smith did not add anything to what the Court had already said in
Ardestani, Nordic Village, and Ohio. Indeed, the reference to Kubrick
offered some indication that the old rule might still apply. The better
reading of Smith, however, reflects the Court's longstanding (though
inconsistent) special treatment of the broad language of the FTCA.
87. Id. at 1184, 1186 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Nordic Village, 503 U.S.
at 34).
88. Id.
89. Justice Stevens insisted that the foreign country exception and another
statutory exception to the general waiver in the FTCA would have been unnecessary if the
FTCA did not apply outside the United States. Id. at 1184-85. The majority did not even
bother to respond to this argument. Justice Stevens also responded at length to the
majority's contention that the choice-of-law provision supported its result. Id. at 1186-90.
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5. IDAHO AND THE SEARCH FOR THE MIDDLE GROUND
The McCarran Amendment governs the participation of the federal
government in state water law adjudications. It provides:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water
of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration
of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or
otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such
suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1)
be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws
are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto
by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction,
and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances:
Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against
the United States in any such suit.9'
Idaho law, in turn, was amended in 1985 and 1986 to prohibit the filing
of a notice of a claim in a water rights adjudication unless the notice "is
submitted with a filing fee." 9' The United States submitted a notice of
a claim without the required filing fee, the state refused to accept it, and
the state courts upheld the state's action.'
The Supreme Court, reversing the state courts nine to zero in United
States v. Idaho,3 held that the United States did not have to pay the
state filing fee because the McCarran Amendment did not waive sovereign
immunity from the fee requirement. But Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion lacked the sweeping nature of the recent opinions in Ardestani,
90. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994).
91. IDAHO CODE § 42-1414 (1990).
92. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources v. United States, 832 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1893 (1993). Justice Boyle dissented from the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision because the "'clear statement' rule" established by Nordic Village required that
"la] statutory waiver must be grounded exclusively upon the statutory text (the textual
requirement) and the waiver must be 'unequivocal' (the unequivocal requirement)."
Idaho, 832 P.2d at 301 (Boyle, J., dissenting). Thus, while acknowledging that "my heart
is with the majority," id. at 306, Justice Boyle nonetheless concluded that the majority's
finding of a waiver conflicted with Nordic Village and Ardestani. Id. at 305-06.
93. 113 S. Ct. 1893 (1993).
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Nordic Village, and Ohio. The Court repeated its admonitions that
waivers must be express, strictly construed, and not enlarged beyond the
statutory language,' but it again quoted its statement in Kubrick that
waivers should not be narrowed beyond congressional intent either.95
The Court struck a middle ground between the government's position
and the state's position.' After rejecting the interpretations advanced
by both parties, the Court concluded that Idaho law improperly
characterized "costs" as "fees." Before 1986, the expenses of water
rights adjudications were denominated "costs" that were paid by all
parties at the conclusion of the suit. After 1986, the same expenses were
denominated "fees" that were paid by all parties at the beginning of the
suit. Idaho's argument that the McCarran Amendment proviso respecting
"costs" did not extend to "fees" thus failed to impress the Court.' The
McCarran Amendment's general reference to "the State laws" which the
United States must heed was not sufficiently specific to satisfy the cases
requiring a "specific waiver of sovereign immunity before the United
States may be held liable for" monetary exactions.9"
Idaho did not state any new principles, and the reference to Kubrick
showed the continued pull of the neutrality view. The result, however,
demonstrated that the Court demanded a clear statement of the scope of
a waiver of sovereign immunity in the statutory text. As in Ohio,
ambiguity meant continued immunity.
94. Id. at 1896.
95. id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979)).
96. The United States argued that there was a differentiation between state
substantive water law (with which the federal government must comply) and state laws
governing procedures and fees (with which the federal government need not comply). Id.
The Court dismissed this argument as "weak" for two reasons: it failed to account for
the different references to "the State laws" in the second sentence and to "State law" in
the first sentence, and it would undermine the undisputed consent to suit by permitting the
federal government to demand special treatment with respect to pleading, discovery,
evidence, or any other procedural matter. id. at 1897. The Court also quoted an earlier
decision "declin[ing] to confine [the McCarran Amendment] so narrowly." id. (quoting
United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971)). J
The state fared no better. It argued that the McCarran Amendment required federal
compliance with all applicable state laws. The Court pointed to the proviso forbidding
the assessment of costs against the United States, and noted its previous strict construction
decisions rejecting efforts to impose monetary liability on the United States "for what are
the normal incidents of litigation between private parties." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only. He was "persuaded that
these exactions are precisely what Congress had in mind when it excepted judgments for
'costs' from its broad waiver of sovereign immunity from participation in water rights
adjudications." Id. at 1898.
1995:771
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
6. MEYERS AND THE "SUE AND BE SUED" CLAUSE EXCEPTION
FDIC v. Meyers' came next, the first blemish (or bright spot, take
your pick) in the Court's recent record. Congress empowered the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), like many other
government corporations and quasi-governmental bodies, "[t]o sue and be
sued, complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the
United States."100 John Meyers sued the FSLIC for depriving him of a
constitutionally protected property right when it fired him from his
management position with a savings and loan seized by the FSLIC. The
Court unanimously rejected the government's claim of sovereign
immunity from the suit."°'
Justice Thomas analyzed the sovereign immunity issue in two parts.
He first rejected the government's argument that the FTCA provided the
exclusive source for Meyers' claim. Section 2679(a) of the FTCA
provides that
Itihe authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its
own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such
federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section
1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in
such cases shall be exclusive."°
The Court characterized the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity as
"broad,"" 3 and it pointedly refused to interpret the statute in a manner
that would yield a narrower waiver of sovereign immunity than the broad
jurisdictional grant." 4 The Court concluded that Meyers' claim was not
99. 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c)(4) (1994). That power vanished in 1989 when Congress
abolished the FSLIC and transferred its functions to the FDIC. See Meyers, 114 S. Ct.
at 999 n.1. Other federally-created bodies that can "sue and be sued" include the
Tennessee Valley Authority, see 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (1994); the American Red Cross,
see 36 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); and the United States Postal Service, 39 U.S.C. § 401(1)
(1994).
101. The decision on the sovereign immunity issue produced a hollow victory for
Meyers. The Court rejected his claimed right to an implied Bivens action against the
Agency itself because such actions are only available against individual government
officials. Meyers, 114 S. Ct. at 1004-06 (referring to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1994).
103. Meyers, 114 S. Ct. at 1000 (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)).
104. Id. at 1002.
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"cognizable under section 1346(b)" of the FTCA, and thus, not precluded
by section 2679(a)."°5
The Court then rejected the government's argument that the "sue and
be sued" clause failed to waive sovereign immunity from Meyers' suit.
The Court's discussion of the waiver worked by the "sue and be sued"
clause was 180 degrees opposite its approach to other waivers of
sovereign immunity: the "sue and be sued" clause was "simple and
broad," "to be 'liberally construed,'" and created "the presumption that
immunity has been waived."" ° That presumption of a complete waiver
could be rebutted only by clear proof of a contrary congressional intent,
a grave effect on governmental functions, or other specific indications
supporting a narrower interpretation." The government sought to
engraft an unwritten exception to the waiver rather than satisfying one of
the statutory exceptions,"~s so the Court held that the "sue and be sued"
clause indeed waived sovereign immunity from Meyers' claim.
Meyers confirmed the existence of two different rules for interpreting
waivers of sovereign immunity. The normal rule (applied in Ardestani,
Nordic Village, Ohio, Smith and Idaho) required a clear statement of the
waiver in the statutory text. The second, special rule governing the
interpretation of "sue and be sued" clauses presumed the existence Of a
waiver absent a clear indication to the contrary. Meyers made no effort
to reconcile these conflicting interpretive strategies, nor did it explain why
"sue and be sued" clauses were so different from other kinds of broad
statutory language.
105. Id. at 1000-02.
106. Id. at 1003 (quoting Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245
(1940)).
107. Id. (quoting Burr, 309 U.S. at 245).
108. With substantial precedent on its side, the government argued that "sue and
be sued" clauses are designed to treat agencies like private parties, and since there are no
implied Bivens claims against private parties, Meyers should not be allowed to bring such
a claim against the government. The Court responded that its previous cases merely
"looked to the liability of a private enterprise as afloor below which the agency's liability
could not fall." Id. at 1004.
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7. WLLIAMS AND THE RETURN TO COMMON SENSE
The last case may be the most interesting. Lori Williams and her
husband, Jerrold Rabin, owned a house. Rabin also owned part of a
restaurant, and he personally incurred and failed to pay federal taxes
related to the restaurant. Then-in short succession-Williams obtained
sole title to the house when she and Rabin divorced, the IRS filed a tax
lien on the house to recover the taxes owed by Rabin, Williams entered
into a contract to sell the house, and the IRS provided actual notice of the
lien to Williams one week before the closing. When the buyer of the
house threatened to sue Williams if she did not go through with the sale,
Williams paid the IRS $41,937 to remove the tax lien. Williams then
moved to recover the money, arguing that she had taken title to the house
free of the lien because the IRS had not provided her with proper notice
of the lien at the time of her divorce. In Williams v. United States,"°
the Court held six to three that Williams had standing to protest the lien
even though the IRS had actually assessed the tax against her former
husband.
Justice Ginsburg relied on Ohio and Nordic Village as stating the
appropriate test: "we may not enlarge the waiver beyond the purview of
the statutory language," and "[olur task is to discern the 'unequivocally
expressed' intent of Congress, construing ambiguities in favor of
immunity."" ° She found such a clear intent in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1),
which creates federal jurisdiction over "[any civil action against the
United States for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have
been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected."' The
government, however, focused on three other provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (1) requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies
prior to instituting suit, (2) limiting administrative remedies to
"taxpayers," and (3) defining "taxpayer" narrowly.1 2  The Court
responded that other parts of the Code indicated that refunds are available
to parties who are not actually assessed the tax.1 3  In any event, the
Court added, Williams could be viewed as being "subject to any internal
109. 115 S. Ct. 1611 (1995).
110. id. at 1615-16 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1616 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994)).
112. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (1994) (providing that administrative claims "shall
be filed by the taxpayer"); 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (1994) (requiring administrative exhaustion
prior to suit); 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14) (1994) (defining "taxpayer" as "any person subject
to any internal revenue tax").
113. Williams, 115 S. Ct at 1617.
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revenue tax," and thus a "taxpayer," by virtue of the lien placed on her
house. 114
But Justice Ginsburg did not end her analysis there. She expressed
the Court's "preference for common sense inquiries over formalism."
' 15
She then detailed how Williams (and others in her position) would be
denied any realistic remedies under a different reading of the Code. " 6
Even the general principle that a party may not challenge the tax liability
of another merited an exception in this case.117
Justice Scalia, the author of Nordic Village, agreed. He found the
administrative exhaustion provisions "too remote" to limit the waiver of
sovereign immunity stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)." 8  He
acknowledged that the clear statement rule for waivers of sovereign
immunity applied to the determination of the scope of such waivers, but
he denied that the rule "require[d] explicit waivers to be given a meaning
that is implausible." "9 Finally, quoting Justice Cardozo, Justice Scalia
proclaimed that "'the exemption of the sovereign from suit involves
hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to
its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been
announced.""2
The dissenters-Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas-found it difficult to reconcile this decision with the Court's
recent precedent. They characterized the decision as "an unusual
departure from the bedrock principle that waivers of sovereign immunity
must be 'unequivocally expressed,'" and they objected that the Court's
discussion of the equities addressed "a factor not usually of great
significance in construing the Internal Revenue Code." 2 1 They agreed
with the government that Williams lacked standing because of the three
provisions governing administrative exhaustion, noting that the Court's
admission that those provisions were "inconsistent" with other parts of the
Code should have meant that a waiver did not exist.'"
114. ld.
115. Id. at 1618.
116. Id. at 1618-20.
117. Id. at 1619-20.
118. Id. at 1620 (Scalia, J., concurring). He thus found it unnecessary to
characterize Williams as a taxpayer, as the Court had done, but he joined Justice
Ginsburg's opinion in every other respect. Id.
119. Id.
120. ld. (quoting United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383
(1949), which quoted Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y.
1926)).
121. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1621 ("an 'inconsistency' is not enough to carry the day when dealing
with a waiver of sovereign immunity; 'inconsistency' simply means ambiguity, and
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They were right, or rather, they were right according to Nordic
Village, Ohio, and Idaho. Only in Williams was the Court persuaded that
Congress had waived sovereign immunity in the face of a statutory
scheme whose provisions did not all point in the same direction. Williams
thus calls into question the clear statement rule the Court had developed
in its preceding five terms.
C. Making Sense of What the Supreme Court Has Done
These cases-especially Ardestani, Nordic Village, and
Ohio-indicate that the Court has created a clear statement rule regarding
waivers of federal sovereign immunity. This is new. The Court has
often insisted that waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally
expressed in the statutory text, but the recent cases give that charge some
extra teeth. Ardestani refused to consider the purpose of the statute in
deciding whether the statute waived sovereign immunity. Nordic Village
refused to consider the legislative history in deciding whether the statute
waived sovereign immunity. Ohio held that an ambiguous statute does
not waive sovereign immunity. Coupled with the results in Smith and
Idaho, it appears that the Court has created a clear statement rule without
clearly stating so.
But the lower federal courts and the state courts have struggled to
make sense of these decisions-even before Williams. Justice Boyle's
dissenting opinion from the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Idaho most
clearly recognizes the creation of a clear statement rule123-and the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously vindicated his dissent. A number of other
courts have read Ardestani, Nordic Village, and Ohio as limiting the
search for a waiver of sovereign immunity to the unambiguous statutory
text.124 Some courts, however, have continued to apply the traditional
because a waiver of sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally expressed,' any ambiguity
is construed in favor of immunity").
123. Justice Boyle observed that "to meet the textual requirement for a waiver
under the United States Supreme Court's clear statement test, the legislative history of a
statute, the purpose of a statute, and even equitable considerations are all irrelevant."
Idaho Dep't of Water Resources v. United States, 832 P.2d 289, 302 (1992) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) and
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137-38 (1991)), rev'd, 113 S, Ct. 1893 (1993).
124. See Department of Army v. FLRA, 56 F.3d 273, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Moore v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 53 F.3d 991,994 (5th Cir. 1995); Beneficial
Consumer Discount Co. v. Poltonowicz, 47 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1995); Dorsey v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 41 F.3d 1551, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Hensel v. Office of the
Chief Admin. Hearing Officer, 38 F.3d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Horn,
29 F.3d 754, 762 (1st. Cir. 1994); Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d
667, 673 (9th Cir. 1993); Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224,
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rule of strict construction rather than a clear statement rule, thereby
permitting the consultation of sources outside the statutory text."z A
few courts insist that sources outside the statutory text may produce a
waiver of sovereign immunity."
To be sure, the Court's recent cases can be viewed as not
establishing a new rule. Two opposite readings support this claim. On
the one hand, the Court has long said that an unequivocal statement is
necessary to produce a waiver of sovereign immunity. If that is true-if
the evidence of a waiver must be clearly spelled out in the text-then no
229 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Jones v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 101 (1993) (en bane); In re
Taylor, 148 B.R. 361, 363-64 (S.D. Ga. 1992); In re Shafer, 146 B.R. 477, 480 (D.
Kan.), rev'd, 148 B.R. 617 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992); Williams v. United States, Civ. No.
91-5286, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13966, at *5, *11 n.6, *16 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 1992).
125. See Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Schall, J., dissenting); Edwards v. United States Dep't of Justice, 43 F.3d 312, 317 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Price, 42 F.3d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994); FMC Corp. v.
United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (discussed infra
notes 282-93 and accompanying text); In re University Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065,
1085 (3d Cir. 1992); Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007, 1010-11, 1015 (1st
Cir. 1992); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 972 F.2d 312, 314 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Waksberg, 881 F. Supp. 36, 39-41 (D.D.C. 1995); Taborski v. IRS, 141 Bankr. L. Rep.
959, 963-64 (N.D. I11. 1992); see also In re Taylor, 148 B.R. at 363-64 (relying on
statutory purpose as alternative basis for finding waiver). Maine is particularly
illuminating because then-Judge Breyer wrote the First Circuit's opinion. In Maine, the
state sought to collect civil penalties from the Navy for environmental violations. The
holding in Ohio blocked the state's effort to rely on the RCRA waiver, so the state tried
§ 120 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1994). Judge Breyer found CERCLA's language
no clearer than RCRA. But he then considered the legislative history of CERCLA for a
possible means of distinguishing Ohio. He did not find any useful evidence in the
legislative history, but the plain implication is that he would have relied on the legislative
history to satisfy the test for a waiver. Maine, 973 F.2d at 1011. That approach is
consistent with Justice Breyer's general view of legislative history. See Stephen Breyer,
On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845
(1992).
126. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994), provides the best
example. The court there acknowledged that "an examination of Congress' purposes and
the historical context of the statute may not serve to waive immunity when the text of the
statute fails to do so unequivocally." Id. at 763. But the court added that the "scope of
such a waiver can only be ascertained by reference to underlying Congressional policy."
Id. The court quoted Franchise Tax Board v. USPS, 467 U.S. 512 (1984), in support of
this latter principle, but Franchise Tax Board involved a "sue and be sued" clause which
the Court treats differently than any other provision waiving sovereign immunity. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text. For other examples of courts refusing to believe
what the Supreme Court has said in its most recent sovereign immunity cases, see Quality
Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569 (1st Cir. 1995) ("We must of course honor
the Supreme Court's current view of the doctrine, but at the same time we may not ignore
Congressional intent and purpose"); Jones, 6 Vet. App. at 108-10 (Kramer, J.,
concurring); id. at 117-19 (Steinberg, J., dissenting).
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room exists for arguments about legislative history, statutory purpose, or
anything else. The recent decisions may simply mean that the Court is
finally taking its own rhetoric seriously. On the other hand, the Court
has a history of announcing conflicting standards for interpreting waivers
of sovereign immunity, and the latest decisions may only represent a
temporary swing toward one of the two different lines of precedent
described above.' The Court may continue to look at more than the
unequivocal statutory text in determining whether a waiver has occurred.
From this perspective, it remains to be seen whether the Court means
what it says.
Perhaps. But the weight of the evidence suggests that the Court has
done more. The recent decisions broke from the past both in their stated
test and especially in their application of that test. Before Ardestani, the
Supreme Court relied on the purpose of a statute in finding a waiver of
sovereign immunity in a number of cases.'" Likewise, before Nordic
Village, the Supreme Court examined legislative history in the course of
determining the existence or reach of a waiver of sovereign immunity in
a number of cases.' And the Court read statutory language as
working a waiver despite other possible readings of the statute before
Ohio.'10
I agree with the other commentators who conclude that the Court has
established a new rule.' But the lower courts are confused, and the
blame for that confusion rests on the shoulders of the Supreme Court.
The conflicting statements in earlier sovereign immunity opinions, along
with the absence of any explanation for the seeming creation of a new
rule in the recent decisions, have left the lower federal courts with
uncertain guidance on how to proceed. It has also left both private and
government litigants uncertain of the proper standard and almost always
in a position to make a good faith argument for the result they desire.
127. See supra part H.A.
128. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
131. See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 595 n.4, 643
(describing Nordic Village as creating "a new super-strong clear statement rule" against
waivers of federal sovereign immunity); see also Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme
Court's New Sovereign Inmunity Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment.: Toward Ending
State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 460-61 (1994)
(Nordic Village establishes a new two-part test for interpreting waivers of sovereign
immunity that requires an "exclusively textual" examination and "no alternative
interpretation"); Timothy J. Simeone, Note, Rule 11 and Federal Sovereign Immunity:
Respecting the Explicit Waiver Requirement, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043, 1048 (1993)
(Ardestani, Nordic Village and Ohio "support the view that the Court has toughened the
.unequivocal expression' standard").
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Moreover, Congress lacks the direction it needs to know how to write
waivers of sovereign immunity. The benefits that would flow from an
established, widely recognized clear statement rule have not been realized.
III. A THEORY OF CLEAR STATEMENT RULES APPLIED TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Commentators have not been kind to the Supreme Court's treatment
of waivers of sovereign immunity.132 For that matter, they have not
endorsed the Court's general approach to statutory construction,
either.133  As David Shapiro has observed, "[wihile academics
132. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Among the most recent decisions,
Ohio has drawn the most academic attention. See Robert V. Percival, Overcoming
Interpretive Formalism: Legislative Reversals of Judicial Constructions of Sovereign
Immunity Waivers in the Environmental Statutes, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
221 (1993); Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance with
Environmental Laws: Where Do We Go from Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 801
(1993); Rebecca Heintz, Note, Federal Sovereign Immunity and Clean Water: A Supreme
Misstep, 24 ENVTL L. 263, 282-91 (1994); see also Stan Millan, Federal Facilities &
Environmental Compliance: Toward a Solution, 36 LOY. L. REV. 319 (1990); Kenneth
M. Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons from Twenty Years of
Waiving Federal Immunity to State Regulation, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (1991-92);
Margaret N. Strand & Stephen L. Samuels, Federal Facilities' Liability for Civil Penalties
Under RCRA and the Clean Water Act, 2 FED. FACILITIES ENVTL. J. 307 (1991); Louise
M. Gleason & Marie I. Goutzounis, Note, Clearing the Air of Sovereign Immunity: Ohio
v. United States Department of Energy, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 287, 298-305
(1991); Rothmel, supra note 27, at 602-18; Wolverton, supra note 27, at 577-85; Corinne
B. Yates, Note, Limitations of Sovereign Immunity Under the Clean Water Act:
Empowering States to Confront Federal Polluters, 90 MICH. L. REV. 183 (1991).
For discussions of the other recent cases, see Peter H. Carroll III, Literalism: The
United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy
Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); Feldman, supra note 131, at 43; Kevin R.
Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion ": The Plain Meaning of Executive
Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 479-87 (1993); Robert K.
Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Mark Dean, Note, Smith v. United
States: Justice Denied under the FTCA "Foreign Country" Exception, 38 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 553 (1993-94); Simeone, supra note 131, at 1043.
133. The commentators have been prolific, too. I listed some of the most recent
works in John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 233 n.146 (1993).
See also Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem ofLegislative Supremacy, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 767, 767-68 n.I (1991) (listing articles); Shapiro, supra note 11, at 921-22 n.1
(listing more articles). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES & MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
513-879 (2d ed. 1995); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 757-1049
(1995); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND
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vigorously debate the merits and applicability of deconstructionism, public
choice theory, purposive analysis, and various theories of 'dynamic'
statutory interpretation, Justices of the Supreme Court are attempting with
missionary zeal to narrow the focus of consideration to the statutory text
and its 'plain meaning.'""' I am more sympathetic to the Court's
recent statutory construction decisions, 13 but for reasons that produce
questions about the wisdom of employing a clear statement rule to
interpret waivers of federal sovereign immunity.
The goal of the Court's general approach to statutory construction is
to determine what Congress has done. That goal encompasses a number
of divergent methods of statutory interpretation: searching for the original
meaning of the statutory language;" relying on the plain meaning of
the statutory language;1 37 examining the text, purpose and history of the
statute in an effort to ascertain legislative intent; 13 asking how Congress
would have answered the particular question at hand; 39 or some
combination of those approaches. Many of the Court's most recent
decisions treat the statutory language as nearly conclusive when it is plain,
but they are willing to consult secondary sources to interpret ambiguous
statutory language."4
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 307-717 (1993).
134. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 921-22.
135. For a more thorough explanation of my attitude toward the Court's recent
statutory interpretation decisions, see Nagle, supra note 16, at 2220-50.
136. "Theories of statutory interpretation in the United States have in this century
emphasized the original meaning of statutes . . . ." ESKRIDOE, supra note 11, at 13.
Judge Easterbrook defended this approach in In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir.
1989).
137. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994);
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2157 (1993); Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992); United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 243-44 (1989).
138. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
139. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Co., 154 F.2d 785, 789-93 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J.), aff'd,
328 U.S. 275 (1946); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
286-93 (1985).
140. See, e.g., Estate of Cowert, 112 S. Ct. at 2594; Freytag v. Commissioner of
IRS, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991). The point at which the Court will look beyond the
statutory language remains in dispute. Compare Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-54 n.9 (1989) (court may go beyond plain meaning in a
number of circumstances) with id. at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (court may go beyond
plain meaning only if that meaning is absurd) and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (court may ignore plain meaning if "established canons of
construction" require a different result). The use of legislative history has been especially
controversial. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 133, at 249 n.225 (listing recent commentary
on legislative history).
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This is an originalist theory. In broad terms, it constitutes the
approach to statutory interpretation traditionally employed in American
courts,14' and its various premises have been ably defended by writers
such as Thomas Merrill, Martin Redish, Frank Easterbrook, and
Frederick Schauer. 42 It presumes that the proper manner in which to
interpret a statute is "archaeological"-to dig up evidence regarding the
meaning, intention, or purpose of the enacting Congress.4 The
Court's originalist approach contrasts with other theories of statutory
interpretation that support a more conscious effort to account for current
societal preferences and to consider a broader range of evidence when
interpreting a statute, and conversely, give less weight to the statutory text
and the original legislative intent.'"
. The traditional canons of statutory interpretation fit within an
originalist framework. These canons simply create presumptions of
statutory meaning, allocate the burden for establishing statutory meaning,
or operate as tiebreakers in close cases. The linguistic canons (e.g.,
ejusdem generis, inclusio unis) and a number of substantive canons (e.g.,
the rule of lenity, the presumption of consistency with international law)
operate in this fashion. 45 The canons thus help Congress write
legislation. As William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have observed,
resource and time constraints prevent Congress from anticipating every
issue raised by a proposed statute. By instructing Congress about the
consequences of writing a statute in a particular manner, the canons
141. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 13.
142. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
621 (1994); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68
TUL. L. REV. 803 (1994); Schauer, supra note 46, at 250-56; W. David Slawson,
Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law,
44 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992).
143. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 13.
144. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
7 (1982) (endorsing judicial updating of statutes); ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 48-80
(advocating "dynamic" statutory interpretation that considers a variety of factors,
including current values, in addition to originalist sources); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988) (proposing a nautical
metaphor of statutory interpretation in which a statute is a ship built by Congress whose
voyage is charted by Congress but where subsequent navigators also play a role); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407, 411-14
(1989) (rejecting traditional originalist understandings and proposing an approach that
prevents irrational results or results that are inconsistent with modem government).
145. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 600-01,
603-04; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 927-31; Sunstein, supra note 144, at 451-60.
1995:771
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
provide common background rules that Congress can rely upon and need
not repeat every time it enacts a statute. The cost of drafting legislation
is reduced, and fewer holes are left unplugged." *  In this way the
canons operate as a short-hand understanding of what Congress probably
intended when it used certain statutory language. The canons also further
values that the courts find important, but the ease with which canons can
be overcome by other evidence of statutory meaning-including evidence
from outside the statutory text-demonstrates that the canons are
subservient to legislative intent. 47
The strongest clear statement rules conclusively presume that a
statute maintains the status quo unless the statute very specifically says
otherwise in the statutory text." They begin the same way as the
Court's general approach to statutory interpretation-by seeking to
ascertain the plain meaning of the statutory text-but they treat ambiguous
statutory language much differently. Ambiguity is decisive for such rules.
A statute that is susceptible to more than one interpretation cannot satisfy
a clear statement rule. 49  If the statute does not contain the requisite
clear statement that, for example, the statute waives a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity, then the inquiry is finished and the party asserting
that the statute waives such immunity has failed. Nordic Village, Ohio,
and Idaho demonstrate that statutory ambiguity operates in the same
146. Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 66.
147. The academic response to the canons has been critical, as best demonstrated
by Karl Llewellyn's celebrated effort to show that each canon can be countered by an
equal and opposite canon. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). See also Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism,
86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 852 (1988) ("Most political canons, such as the principle that.
. .statutes waiving sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed, are arbitrary,
premised on dubious extra-textual propositions, or selectively ignored."). Recently,
however, the defenders of the traditional canons have spoken up. David Shapiro has
argued that the canons of statutory interpretation preserve continuity in policymaking that
serves as a good predictor of what Congress wanted and that is valuable in its own right.
Shapiro, supra note 11, at 925, 942-45. As discussed below, Cass Sunstein and William
Eskridge view canons positively, although they favor different canons than those employed
by the Court. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1061-84 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 405. For a
discussion of canons generally, see Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory
Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992).
148. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1011 ("The substantive canons of
construction tend to operate as clear statement rules or presumptions: Unless the
legislature clearly intends to displace an established background understanding, the court
will presume that the understanding is part of the. statute.").
149. See Feldman, supra note 131, at 460; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 940, 959;
Simeone, supra note 131, at 1051.
Clear Statement Rules
manner under the Court's clear statement rule for federal sovereign
immunity."
At times, however, the Court has applied clear statement rules that
are satisfied by less than a specifically targeted statement in the statutory
text. The Court found a waiver in the arguably ambiguous provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code in Williams, and it even recited the equities of
Lori Williams's case against the government-something that would
appear to be anathema under Ardestani, Nordic Village, and Ohio.'
The Court discussed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
at length before it held in Landgraf v. USI Film Products'52 that certain
provisions of that Act do not apply retroactively, despite Justice Scalia's
objection that nothing in a statute's legislative history could ever satisfy
a clear statement rule. 53 William Eskridge and Philip Frickey thus
have distinguished between clear statement rules that can be satisfied by
evidence outside the statutory text and despite plausible alternative
readings of the text, and "super-strong" clear statement rules that can
only be satisfied by a specific statement in the statutory text indicating,
for example, that sovereign immunity is waived in a particular
circumstance." The Court itself has never distinguished among clear
statement rules, but Eskridge and Frickey's suggestion is useful. In
particular, I rely upon it below to argue that the strongest clear statement
rules must be supported by the strongest justifications.'55
The strongest clear statement rules pursue a different objective than
the canons and other originalist tools of statutory interpretation. "Such
rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield
important values from an insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace
them."" The establishment of clear statement rules protects certain
150. See supra part II.B.2-3, 5; see also Idaho Dep't of Water Resources v. United
States, 832 P.2d 289, 303-04 (Idaho 1992) (Boyle, J., dissenting) ("any reasonable
statutory interpretation that does not entail a waiver of sovereign immunity is enough to
illustrate that the statute is not an unequivocal waiver of a federal waiver"), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 1893 (1993).
151. See supra part lI.B. 1-3.
152. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
153. Id. at 1522 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
154. See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 655; Eskridge
& Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 82-83.
155. See infra part 11I.A.1.
156. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1655 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the federalism clear statement rules "are rules for determining
intent when legislation leaves intent subject to question"); Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 790 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the clear statement rule,
at bottom, is a tool of statutory construction like any other" that is used to discover
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constitutional or other values and requires Congress to specifically focus
on those values before disturbing them.'57 These values may derive
from the Constitution, other statutes, or common law; 5' often they are
underenforced by the judiciary.'" By contrast, values that lack the
necessary "magnitude and constancy" will not be protected by a clear
statement rule.16
William Eskridge has rightly observed that "the Anglo-American
legal tradition has employed clear statement rules for as long as it has
done statutory interpretation. ""' But the Court has never identified the
source of its power to establish clear statement rules. Indeed, the Court
has never fully explained the source of its power to announce any rules
of statutory interpretation. The Constitution itself does not contain a list
of directions for the judiciary (or others) to follow when interpreting
statutes. Yet there is an increasing awareness that the choice of an
interpretive framework is ultimately a question of constitutional law.
One's understanding of constitutional theory, separation of powers, and
democratic theory inevitably influences one's approach to statutory
interpretation. 162
The choice of interpretive frameworks affects one's view of clear
statement rules. Eskridge, Frickey, and Cass Sunstein have examined
clear statement rules and other canons of statutory interpretation from a
perspective that questions critical premises of originalist theories. They
endorse the judiciary's selection of particular substantive values to guide
statutory interpretation, though they disagree with the substantive values
currently advanced through the clear statement rules and canons followed
by the Rehnquist Court. 63 By contrast, an originalist perspective views
clear statement rules less favorably than it views weaker canons of
legislative intent).
157. The Court recognized this idea in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336
(1971), where it explained that "[in traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation
affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature
has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the
judicial decision." Id. at 349. See also Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note
11, at 631; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 959.
158. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991);
Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1019-61.
159. Eskridge and Frickey have developed this argument, as discussed infra notes
180-205 and accompanying text.
160. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 107.
161. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1065.
162. For additional discussion of the influence that broader constitutional and
democratic theory has on theories of statutory interpretation, see Nagle, supra note 16,
at 2236-49.
163. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
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statutory interpretation. As an originalist who is skeptical of entrusting
the courts with choosing policy values and who is committed to legislative
supremacy, I question the effect of clear statement rules in all but a few
instances.
Consider two roles that clear statement rules can play in an
originalist interpretive regime. The first role is instrumental. "[Tihe
requirement of a clear statement by Congress . . . ought to be of
assistance to the Congress and the courts in drafting and interpreting
legislation."" Canons of statutory interpretation can assist a court in
understanding the meaning of statute or what Congress intended. Canons
can also assist Congress as it drafts legislation by identifying ex ante how
the courts will interpret particular statutory language. But a clear
statement rule sometimes fails to perform this role. If a rule prevents a
court from understanding the meaning of a statute or what Congress
intended, or if Congress struggles to satisfy the rule even when it focuses
on the issue, or if the Court applies the rule inconsistently, then the rule
no longer benefits Congress and actually threatens legislative supremacy.
The second role is more substantive. Clear statement rules can guard
values deserving special judicial protection. Such rules protect special
values by requiring deliberate legislative consideration before a court will
conclude that the legislature decided to act contrary to those values.
16'
A court thus protects itself and Congress from charges of neglecting
important public values by assuming that Congress does not intend to
tread on such values unless it specifically says so. The justification for
clear statement rules is that some values are deserving of heightened
protection by the courts to assure that Congress does not inadvertently
disturb them. That means that the converse is also true: a clear statement
rule is unnecessary for a value unworthy of heightened judicial protection.
These two roles and their limitations suggest two questions that
should guide the Court's establishment of clear statement rules. First, are
the values at stake sufficiently important to justify the creation of a clear
statement rule? Second, would Congress be easily able to provide the
requisite clear statement? Both questions must be answered affirmatively
in order to justify a clear statement rule.
The answers to these two questions in the context of waivers of
sovereign immunity point against a clear statement rule. Sovereign
immunity protects separation of powers values that are similar to the
164. Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206 (1991);
accord Note, supra note 2, at 1967 n.42. This role is similar to the role played by other,
less powerful canons of statutory interpretation. See supra notes 145-47 and
accompanying text.
165. See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 66; Shapiro,
supra note 11, at 959.
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constitutional values protected by other clear statement rules. On the
other hand, while it is easy for Congress to write a provision that waives
sovereign immunity generally, it is difficult for Congress to write a
provision that specifies the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity. The
scope of the waiver is the far more important issue, as evidenced by each
of the Supreme Court's seven most recent cases. Moreover, a clear
statement rule threatens legislative supremacy, especially because
Congress does not share the same enthusiasm for sovereign immunity that
the Court has demonstrated in its most recent decisions. Faced, then,
with doubtful signals about the wisdom of employing a clear statement
rule for interpreting the scope of waivers of sovereign immunity, the
better course counsels against such a rule.
A. The Values Protected by a Clear Statement Rule
The Constitution empowers Congress to resolve competing public
values. The courts should only displace the policies established in the
legislative process if the resulting statute threatens constitutional values
upon which Congress cannot infringe. Yet the presence of a
constitutional norm does not necessarily justify the judicial creation of a
clear statement rule. Because most constitutional provisions are enforced
fully through judicial review, only a deliberate judicial decision not to
strike down legislation as violative of a particular constitutional norm
supports a judicial insistence on a clear statement as a matter of statutory
interpretation. The constitutional separation of powers may be an
example of such a deliberately underenforced constitutional norm, and
federal sovereign immunity may rest on separation of powers principles,
but the case for both propositions is tenuous. Thus, it is difficult to argue
that a clear statement rule for interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity
is needed to protect an underenforced constitutional norm.
1. IDENTIFYING THE VALUES DESERVING THE PROTECTION OF A CLEAR
STATEMENT RULE
The Rehnquist Court has protected a broad range of values through
its use of clear statement rules, presumptions, and other canons. The
Court has drawn these values from the Constitution (e.g., federalism,
separation of powers, and due process), statutes (e.g., rules for reading
statutory exceptions and to avoid repeals by implication), and the common
law (e.g., rules regarding governmental duties and adopting traditional
Clear Statement Rules
immunities).1" The Court has also employed rules favoring certain
groups, including veterans, Native Americans, and aliens. 67
Eskridge and Frickey have criticized the Court's choice of preferred
values. They see the Court favoring private elites over governmental
regulation, state sovereignty over national regulation, and executive
rulemaking over congressional lawmaking.'" Eskridge has also
criticized the Court for preferring obsolescent values and establishment
values."6 But they fault the Court only for the values it has chosen, not
for its decision to protect preferred values. Indeed, Sunstein and Eskridge
have proposed their own lists of values to be protected through canons of
statutory interpretation. Sunstein has identified over two dozen canons
that the Court should apply in the modem regulatory state. Many of the
canons are designed to counteract perceived political and regulatory
pathologies, including canons to alleviate collective action problems,
canons to protect non-market values, and canons to minimize interest
group transfers." For example, Sunstein would read environmental
statutes broadly to respond to "regulatory 'failure' resulting from
collective action problems (not to mention unrepresented future
generations, which cannot wield political power)."171 Eskridge, in turn,
would "decide close cases against politically salient interests that have
been subordinated in the political process."'" His aspirations
are that statutes respect and protect individual rights, especially
those of disadvantaged groups; that broad public interest statutes
166. The Court's substantive rules are categorized in ESKRIDGE, supra note 11,
at 325-28; Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 101-08.
167. See, e.g., King v. Saint Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991) (statutes
should be interpreted liberally to provide benefits to veterans); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (ambiguities in deportation statutes should be interpreted in
favor of aliens); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)
(statutes are to be interpreted liberally to favor Indians). Eskridge finds the rule favoring
aliens of questionable vitality in light of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 332 n.89.
168. Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 640.
169. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1086-91.
170. Sunstein, supra note 144, at 476-89. For a critical review of Sunstein's
theory, see Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the
Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (1990). For Sunstein's
response, see Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247
(1990).
171. Sunstein, supra note 144, at 478. Moglen and Pierce question the application
of this canon because of the difficulty (if not impossibility) of distinguishing between
collective action problems and wealth transfers. See Moglen & Pierce, supra note 170,
at 1236-39.
172. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 149.
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not be eroded by rent-seeking exceptions; that special interest
statutes be narrowly construed; and that statutory schemes be
allowed to change over time to adapt their goals to new
circumstances and political values."r
Perhaps the Court's choice of values is defensible. Thomas Merrill,
for example, finds Chief Justice Rehnquist's tendency to promote majority
rights over individual rights, and states rights over the interests of the
federal government, to be grounded in a principled commitment to
pluralism.174  But the problem with any list of preferred values-the
Court's, the Chief Justice's, Eskridge's, or Sunstein's-is that it permits
the values of the Court to displace the values of Congress. This is less
troubling to Eskridge and Sunstein because they envision a role for the
courts in statutory interpretation beyond understanding the statutory text
and legislative intent. Eskridge defends the judicial imposition of public
values through rules of statutory interpretation unless the text and
legislative history are clear (which, he adds, does not occur that
frequently).175 He recognizes the countermajoritarian problems of
allowing judges to substitute their values for congressional policy
judgments, but he argues that legislative supremacy is "subordinate, or
not superior, to the precept that lawmaking is informed by values formed
through a process of public discussion." 76 Sunstein purports to limit
his canons to cases of statutory ambiguity, but he has been criticized for
"us[ing] his canons both to find ambiguity where it does not otherwise
exist and to resolve the ambiguity so found."'" Eskridge and Frickey
add that the Court signals its preferences to Congress in many ways,
including through clear statement rules and other canons.""7
From an originalist perspective, the role that Sunstein, Frickey, and
Eskridge envision for clear statement rules is troubling. The Constitution
empowers the political branches to choose among important public values,
not the courts. Statutory interpretation, therefore, should seek to remain
faithful to the resolution achieved in the political branches. An
interpretive framework must constrain the permissible choices available
to judges. By contrast, judicial selection and enforcement of the favorite
values of the judiciary is countermajoritarian, a fatal flaw for an
173. Id.; see also id. at 158-59.
174. See Merrill, supra note 142, at 622-25.
175. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1062-66; see also Nagle, supra note 16, at
2214 n. 13 (collecting assertions by Eskridge that originalist sources are indeterminate).
176. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1072.
177. Moglen & Pierce, supra note 170, at 1221.
178. Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 81.
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originalist. As Nicholas Zeppos reminds us, "textualism seeks to
eliminate value choice in judging.""7
Constitutional values are different. "We the People" made the
judgment that constitutional values are especially important. The
Constitution thus obliges each branch of the federal government to protect
those values. The courts protect the values written into the Constitution
through judicial review, the President faithfully executes the Constitution
above all other laws, and Congress must act consistently with the
provisions of the Constitution when it enacts legislation."s  This
constitutional obligation justifies a presumption that a congressional
enactment is consistent with the Constitution.
That does not mean that a clear statement rule should protect all
constitutional values. Such a rule would elevate the rule of reading
statutes to avoid constitutional doubts to a firm command to read all
ambiguous statutory language in a manner that avoids even raising a
constitutional question. The Court's practice is different. It will
invalidate a statute that conflicts with the Constitution, and it often
requires clear statutory language before it will read a statute to produce
an unconstitutional result.' " ' Likewise, the Court often reads
ambiguous statutes in a manner that entirely avoids a constitutional
question, but that rule is even more limited. The Court will only read a
statute in a way that avoids raising a constitutional question if the statute
is ambiguous and the constitutional issue is serious." Moreover, if the
Court determines that the statute is constitutional, the Court will read the
179. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1081 (1992); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez,
The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its
Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 777 (1992) ("The central question may remain
one of legitimacy: do the courts, in our constitutional system, belong in the business of
construing statutes to further important public values?"); Jane S. Schacter,
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 593, 600 (1995) ("The canons have always existed uneasily with the
originalist imperative, for they are created by judges and frequently embody contested
substantive norms. ").
180. For a defense of the constitutional authority of each branch to independently
interpret the Constitution, see Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
181. Even that rule may not require a clear statement. See, e.g., Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464 (1991) ("The canon of construction that a court should
strive to interpret a statute in a way that will avoid an unconstitutional construction is
useful in close cases, but it is 'not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted
by the legislature'") (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 605, 611 (1989)).
182. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
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statute regardless of the (now answered) constitutional question it
raised. I" In short, the Court has not employed a clear statement rule
that would read all statutes to avoid raising a constitutional question
unless the statutory text clearly forced the issue."' The criticisms of
the rule of reading statutes to avoid a constitutional question (as opposed
to an unconstitutional result) show that the Court has followed the proper
approach. "o
There is one exception. If the Court has decided not to enforce fully
a constitutional command through judicial review, then a clear statement
rule with respect to statutes that may violate that command is justified.
This distinction presumes that when prudential reasons persuade the Court
not to enforce certain constitutional norms through judicial review,"
the Court may nonetheless give some weight to those norms in statutory
interpretation. Eskridge and Frickey have described the case for
protecting underenforced constitutional norms through clear statement
rules as follows:
[I]t is not ultimately undemocratic, because Congress can
override the norm through a statutory clear statement; such
rules still provide significant protection for constitutional norms,
because they raise the costs of statutory provisions invading
such norms; and ultimately such rules may even be democracy-
183. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,190 (1991); Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 611;
see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 325.
184. Shapiro includes the rule against reading statutes to avoid constitutional
questions on his list of clear statement rules followed by the Court, see Shapiro, supra
note 11, at 940, as does Harold J. Krent in Avoidance and Its Costs: Application of the
Clear Statement Rule to Supreme Court Review of NLRB Cases, 15 CONN. L. REV. 209
(1983), but Rust, Monsanto, and other cases suggest otherwise.
185. The rule is questioned in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211 (1967);
RICHARD J. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 284-85 (1985); Henry H. Wellington,
Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues,
1961 SuP. CT. REV. 49, 67-71. The tendency to deploy the rule to overcome the natural
force of the statutory language and evidence of legislative intent led Justice Scalia to
characterize it as "the last refuge of many an interpretive lost cause." Reno v. Flores,
113 S. Ct. 1439, 1453 n.9 (1993). 1 hope to develop this argument in a forthcoming
article. See John Copeland Nagle, Problems With Reading Statutes to Avoid
Constitutional Problems (Oct. 14, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
186. Jesse Choper is the leading exponent of this view. See JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). 1 do not mean to
endorse his theory here. Rather, assuming arguendo that the Court should refrain from
adjudicating some constitutional conflicts, I believe that the Court may account for those
constitutional norms through statutory interpretation.
Clear Statement Rules
enhancing by focusing the political process on the values
enshrined in the Constitution."7
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has linked the clear statement rule regarding
congressional regulation of core state functions with the Court's inability
to enforce the Tenth Amendment.' 8
That argument fails to convince Eskridge and Frickey. Using the
federalism cases as an example, they. assert that the very reasons the
Court advanced for not adjudicating Tenth Amendment disputes in Garcia
counsel against giving Tenth Amendment concerns special consideration
in statutory interpretation." 8 If the courts. are unable to develop
principles by which to decide Tenth Amendment cases, as Garcia
suggested, then it is easy to see why crafting a rule for interpreting
statutes implicating the Tenth Amendment is difficult. Or, if the courts
refuse to adjudicate Tenth Amendment cases because such issues should
be left to the political processes, then the court has no role in enforcing
the Tenth Amendment through statutory interpretation, either.
But the question regarding such a clear statement rule does not have
to be posed in such all-or-nothing terms. The Court may lack the
confidence in its ability to develop Tenth Amendment standards needed
to justify invalidating legislation as unconstitutional, but it may feel
sufficiently confident to develop a rule of statutory interpretation to
protect Tenth Amendment values. Similarly, the Court may determine
that its effect on the political process will be sufficiently less in statutory
interpretation cases than in constitutional adjudication. Thus, even if the
concerns about developing consistent principles and the general desire to
leave certain issues to the political processes outweigh the benefits of
judicial review of the Tenth Amendment, those concerns may themselves
be outweighed by the benefits of a clear statement rule. The different
result can be explained in part by the consequences of the Court's
decision: Congress can overcome a clear statement rule by legislation; it
need not amend the Constitution. The list of unenforced constitutional
commands is limited. The federalism values implicit in the Tenth
Amendment offer the most obvious examples," g and the Court has
adopted clear statement rules to protect those values. 9' The republican
187. Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 631.
188. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
189. Id.
190. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), held that
"[sltate sovereign immunity interests ... are more properly protected by the procedural
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power." Id. at 550.
191. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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form of government guarantee" z and the nondelegation doctrine1
also fall in this category, although the Court has not created any clear
statement rules based on those constitutional commands. Employment
Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith'" may be
read as limiting judicial enforcement of the free exercise clause in the
same way.' 95
The list does not grow much longer if it is expanded to include
constitutional provisions that the courts intentionally underenforce.'"
It may, however, include the constitutional separation of powers. Jesse
Choper, Judge Gibbons, and others have urged the Court to decline to
adjudicate separation of powers controversies."9  Mistretta v. United
States9 ' and Morrison v. Olson" provide the best evidence of a
judicial determination not to enforce the constitutional values through
judicial review. Eskridge and Frickey thus have observed that
"separation of powers limits are rarely enforced."2 But the decisions
192. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849),
first held that the guarantee clause presents a nonjusticiable political question.
193. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989), indicates that the
nondelegation doctrine has become unenforced by the Court. See Eskridge & Frickey,
Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 630; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 116 (1994). Justice Rehnquist
would have imposed a clear statement rule to enforce the nondelegation principle in
Industrial Union Dep't v, American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
194. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
195. See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1993) (viewing Smith as "a decision about institutional arrangements more than
about substantive merits," so that Snith is a "political question case, holding that
judicially unmanageable standards for the Free Exercise exemption claims are lacking").
But see Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
Exercise Clause, OHIO ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) ("The labeling of Smith as an
'institutional' decision is overblown. While its rationale may invoke notions of judicial
limitations, Smith nonetheless defines and constitutes substantive free exercise doctrine.").
196. By "intentionally" underenforce, I includeonly those constitutional commands
for which the Court expressly has decided that judicial review is inappropriate, at least
in some circumstances, because of the nature of the command itself. I do not include
constitutional commands that others insist the Court has not enforced fully because they
disagree with the Court's substantive understanding of the command. A claim that the
free speech clause is underenforced, for example, would fail to justify a clear statement
rule because the Court has never indicated that the free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment should not be judicially enforced.
197. See CHOPER, supra note 186, at 263; John J. Gibbons, The Court's Role in
Interbranch Disputes Over Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 957
(1993).
198. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the federal sentencing commission).
199. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel statute).
200. Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 633.
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invalidating statutes on separation of powers grounds in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,"' Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,' Bowsher v.
Synar,' and INS v. Chadha,' indicate that the Court continues to
actively police the separation of powers.' As I will show, the case for
clear statement rules protecting separation of powers values depends on
the correctness of the former view.
2. THE VALUES PROTECTED BY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Notice that federal sovereign immunity does not appear on Sunstein's
or Eskridge's list of values worthy of judicial protection. In fact, both
have characterized federal sovereign immunity as obsolete." None of
the recent sovereign immunity decisions explains why the Court disagrees
or what values a clear statement rule for sovereign immunity is designed
to protect. The criticisms of sovereign immunity are powerful and
many. 7  The historic English theory-"the king can do no
wrong"-has always been anachronistic in the United States. Other
proposed justifications-the indignity of subjecting the government to suit,
the theory that there is no legal right against the lawmaker, and the flood
of frivolous litigation against the government that could overwhelm the
federal courts-fall far short of the unenforced constitutional values
201. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995) (striking down a provision of the Securities Exchange
Act because it instructed the courts to reopen a final judgment).
202. 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (invalidating the commission regulating National and
Dulles Airports).
203. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating part of the Gramm-Rudman budget act).
204. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative vetoes unconstitutional).
205. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, 1994 SUPPLEMENT TO GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & INDIVIDUAL RIGorS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36 (5th ed. 1994)
(claiming that the Court continues to take separation of powers values seriously); Gibbons,
supra note 26, at 968 ("Far from holding that [separation of powers] issues are
nonjusticiable, the Court has, in reaching out for them, stretched the concept of
justiciability close to the breaking point.").
206. Without further explanation, Sunstein included the Court's strict construction
rule for waivers of sovereign immunity on a list of obsolete canons. Sunstein, supra note
144, at 506. Eskridge used sovereign immunity as an example of the Court's "bias for
obsolescent values," arguing that the rule should be "rethought for this era when the
government is our nation's leading contractor and tortfeasor and property owner."
Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1093. Both Sunstein and Eskridge were writing in 1989,
before the Court elevated the rule of strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity
into a clear statement rule. See supra part II.B.
207. See infra notes 221-232 and accompanying text.
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necessary to support a clear statement rule. 8 The need to protect the
public treasury has somewhat greater appeal and sometimes persuades
Congress not to waive sovereign immunity,' but fiscal concerns alone
cannot satisfy the unenforced constitutional value standard. Nonetheless,
it is possible to construct a vision of federal sovereign immunity that
approximates what is needed to justify a clear statement rule under my
approach.
Sovereign immunity may be seen to protect the constitutional
separation of powers. Harold Krent has advanced the most thoughtful
exposition of this argument. 211 "Much of sovereign immunity," Krent
argues, "derives not from the infallibility of the state but from a desire to
maintain a proper balance among the branches of the federal government,
and from a proper commitment to majoritarian rule." 211 Judicial review
of government actions presents greater threats than judicial review of
private actions. The threats result from judicial second-guessing of
congressional and executive decisions. Absent sovereign immunity,
Congress and the executive may feel pressured to conform to the
judiciary's policy values or they may be fettered with contracts entered
208. The sources of these arguments, and some of the responses to them, are
collected in United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 762 (1st Cir. 1994); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 28, at 1108; Block, supra note 26, at 1060-61, 1081-86; Cramton,
supra note 24, at 427; Stevens, supra note 23, at 1123-26; Heintz, supra note 132, at 272-
74.
209. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (1988) (suggesting that sovereign
immunity rests on the assumption that the government itself should decide whether the
diversion of public funds to the cost of litigation outweighs the benefits obtained by
waiving sovereign immunity). The appropriations clause provides constitutional support
for this position. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .... ").
210. Krent, supra note 24. Similarly, Justice Stevens has acknowledged that
"there are certain situations in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity undeniably..
. limits the degree to which the judiciary can second-guess decisions made by the
Executive." Stevens, supra note 23, at 1129. For other acknowledgements of this
justification for sovereign immunity, see United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797,
814 (1984); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-04
(1949); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840); Horn, 29 F.3d at 767;
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 890 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 941 (1991); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.);
ERWIN CHEMIRINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.2.1, at 545-46 (2d ed. 1994); Block,
supra note 26, at 1061; Fallon, supra note 209, at 937. Cramton argued that these goals
are already satisfied by the substantive law governing judicial review of government
action. See Cramton, supra note 24, at 426.
211. Krent, supra note 24, at 1530; see also id. at 1531 (sovereign immunity is
"not so much a barrier to individual rights as it is a structural protection for democratic
rule").
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into by past administrations."' This distinguishes judicial review of
government action from judicial review of private actions because "we are
logically more concerned when the judiciary secondguesses government
policy than when it impinges on corporate expertise."213
Perhaps the starkest example of the manner in which sovereign
immunity shields the government from judicial interference is United
States v. Horn."4 In Horn, the lead federal prosecutor in a criminal
case engaged in particularly egregious prosecutorial misconduct. The
district court sanctioned the government by, among other things, ordering
the government to pay the fees and costs incurred by the defendants in
litigating the issues raised by the prosecutor's misconduct. The district
court relied exclusively on the judiciary's supervisory powers as authority
for shifting the costs to the government. The First Circuit, however, held
that sovereign immunity precluded the imposition of monetary sanctions
against the government. Faced with a rare collision between sovereign
immunity and the judiciary's broad supervisory powers, the court
concluded that sovereign immunity easily prevails. Sovereign immunity
"is mandatory and absolute," it "must be applied mechanically, come
what may," and it "proceeds by fiat: if Congress has not waived the
sovereign's immunity in a given context, the courts are obliged to honor
that immunity."215
Judicial review of government actions also produces fewer benefits
than judicial review of similar conduct by private parties. "As a non-
profit-maximizing actor, the government does not respond as directly to
monetary signals."21 For example, litigation awards against the United
States generally are paid not from the appropriation of the agency that
engaged in the wrongful conduct, but from the Judgment Fund, a general
212. Id. at 1530-31. Krent lists three reasons why Congress may want to retain
sovereign immunity in contract suits: the judiciary may interfere with policy decisions
entrusted to Congress or the executive, the judicial standard of review could permit
second-guessing of congressional or executive choices, and the threat of liability could
overdeter administrative decisionmakers. Id. at 1535-38. Likewise, "[in the absence of
immunity, policymakers might attempt to bind their successors to prior policy ...by
entering into long-term contracts." Id. at 1538.
213. Id. at 1539.
214. 29 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1994).
215. Id. at 764. The court in United States v. Waksberg, 881 F. Supp. 36
(D.D.C. 1995), relied on Horn in holding that sovereign immunity prevails over inherent
judicial power, though it complained that the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity
precedents compelled such a "thoroughly distasteful result." Id. at 41.
216. Krent, supra note 24, at 1539. Krent later writes that "recent cases may be
overprotective of the government from a process perspective, by failing to force the
government to internalize the costs of its activities in situations in which government
policy is less obviously threatened." Id. at 1549.
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appropriation used solely to pay litigation awards." 7 The agency does
not suffer any economic disincentive for its actions. But other
mechanisms channel government conduct. "Unlike private entities,"
Krent notes, "the government acts subject to considerable political checks
and balances."218 These include elections, congressional oversight
hearings, executive agency accountability to the President, and a number
of other formal and informal restraints on government actors. 2 9 Thus,
"[t]he political and administrative processes may serve as substitutes for
private lawsuits to deter arbitrary government action. " '
The constitutional separation of powers may qualify as a value
worthy of the special protection of a clear statement rule to the extent that
the Court is increasingly likely to decline to enforce those constitutional
commands through judicial review." But transposing Krent's analysis
to provide a justification for a clear statement rule for waivers of
sovereign immunity faces at least three obstacles. First, it proves too
much. Krent's suspicion of judicial oversight of executive action calls
into question a lot more than federal sovereign immunity. Marbury v.
Madison' itself establishes the judicial role in reviewing executive and
legislative actions. Courts permit injunctive relief against executive
agencies and officials far more frequently than traditional sovereign
immunity doctrine would suggest.'m
217. 31 U.S.C. § 1304(1994). The Comptroller General recently decided that the
Judgment Fund could be used to pay most CERCLA claims against the government. In
re Judgment Fund and Litigative Awards Under the Comprehensive Envtl. Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, No. B-253179, 1993 WL 505822 (Comp. Gen. 1993).
By contrast, President Bush ordered that civil penalties assessed against federal agencies
for violations of state hazardous waste laws must be paid from the agency's own
appropriated funds. See 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1868, 1869 (Oct. 12, 1992); see
also Cary, supra note 24, at 839 n.239.
218. Krent, supra note 24, at 1540.
219. Id. at 1532.
220. Id. The evolution of the environmental laws, however, demonstrates an
increasing reliance on private actions, especially citizen suits, to enforce federal and state
environmental laws against federal facilities. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (Clean
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (Clear Air Act). The independent counsel statute
provides another example of dissatisfaction with historic procedures for governing the
government itself. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994). For differing views of the need for
the independent counsel statute, see TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989 (1989);
Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Peter
W. Rodino, Jr., The Case for the Independent Counsel, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 5
(1994).
221. See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
222. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
223. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 28, at 1108-29.
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Second, the values threatened by sovereign immunity are forceful in
their own right. Sovereign immunity denies remedies to people wronged
by the government.' This is contrary to "modern democratic notions
of the moral responsibility of the State."' Sovereign immunity also
"obfuscates the real issues, which are whether particular government
activity should be subject to judicial review, and, if so, what form of
relief is appropriate."' Akhil Amar has argued that the Court's
sovereign immunity doctrine misperceives the very nature of sovereignty
itself. 7 So why should the Court favor the values protected by
sovereign immunity against the values threatened by sovereign immunity?
Third, Krent himself observes that the necessary implication of his
justification for sovereign immunity is that Congress must decide whether
the need to insulate government actions from judicial interference or the
need to provide a judicial remedy for government wrongs prevails in a
particular case. The values must be balanced,"8 and they must be
balanced by Congress. "The dominant justification for sovereign
immunity must be that we trust Congress, unlike any other entity, to set
the rules of the game."' Several factors account for the unique
224. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 478 (1793) (Jay, C.J.)
("I wish the State of society was so far improved, and the science of Government
advanced to such a degree of perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceable
course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens."); see also
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42-46 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Akhil Amar has written that "[lew propositions of law are as basic today-and were as
basic and universally embraced two hundred years ago-as the ancient legal maxim, ubi
jus, ibi renediun: Where there is a right, there should be a remedy." Amar, supra note
37, at 1485-86.
225. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); see also National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359-60
(1955); Block, supra note 26, at 1062; Heintz, supra note 132, at 271 & n.55.
226. Cramton, supra note 24, at 425.
227. See Amar, supra note 37, at 1429-66. The Supreme Court remains sharply
divided concerning the nature of sovereignty under the Constitution. Compare U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (opinion for the Court of Stevens, J.)
(concluding that the people of the United States, as a whole, are sovereign) and id. at
1872-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same) with id. at 1875-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the people of each state are sovereign).
228. "Retained immunity thus makes sense when the political harm from judicial
review-interference with government policymaking-outweighs any incremental gain
from added deterrence of government tortious behavior and added efficiency in
government contracting." Krent, supra note 24, at 1579.
229. Id. at 1531. In other words, "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity allows
Congress to determine when the need for preserving majoritarian policy, set by Congress
itself or its delegates in the executive branch, eclipses the need for private monitoring of
governmental conduct." Id. at 1533. Krent writes elsewhere that "[ajlthough the case
for blanket immunity is tenuous, our system of separated powers assigns Congress the
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position of Congress to balance the competing values. It is politically
accountable to the public. It possesses special resources for learning the
practical consequences of whether to subject the government to suit.23
And Congress can employ sovereign immunity "to protect majoritarian
policy both from the horizontal pull of comparatively unaccountable
judges, and from the temporal pull of now unaccountable government
officials of the past.""' Simply put, "Congress is the institutional
entity best situated to assess waiver on a case-by-case basis."1 2
The central congressional role in balancing the values protected by
sovereign immunity with the values disturbed by sovereign immunity
undercuts the case for a clear statement rule. If the justification for
sovereign immunity is to allow Congress to determine the appropriate
balance between protecting government policymaking and providing
remedies to those injured by government actions, then the object of
interpreting statutory waivers of sovereign immunity should be to
ascertain and implement the deliberate balance achieved by Congress.
That is the goal of the Court's typical approach to statutory interpretation:
to best understand the rules that Congress intended to establish. A clear
statement rule thus fails on two counts. It forsakes a full examination of
the balance Congress achieved, and it tips the balance by assuming that
one of the two values always prevails absent an irresistible indication to
the contrary.
But all clear statement rules are subject to this attack. The
extraterritorial application of a statute must be stated clearly in order to
"protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord," 3 but Congress is
responsible for balancing that value against the benefits incident to
applying domestic laws to conduct overseas. Waivers of the immunity of
states from suit must be stated clearly to protect the commands of the
Eleventh Amendment,' but Congress is responsible for balancing that
power to determine when continued immunity is appropriate to protect the political
process." Id. at 1580. The Court itself has made much the same point in the Eleventh
Amendment context. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (because "the
legislative department of a State represents its polity and its will," "the Legislature, and
not the courts, is the judge" of when to waive sovereign immunity), quoted in United
States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 764 (1st Cir. 1994).
230. For an example of congressional hearings considering suits against the
government, see Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the
Subcommn. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
231. Krent, supra note 24, at 1533.
232. Id.
233. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
234. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
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value against the benefits of permitting such suits. The premise of clear
statement rules is that one of those values is entitled to greater weight
than the other even though we ultimately trust Congress to do the
balancing. That is why the contstitutional source of the value is necessary,
and why even some constitutional values may be enforced more
effectively through direct judicial review instead of through a clear
statement rule of statutory interpretation.
B. Ability of Congress to Satisfy a Clear Statement Rule
The existence of an unenforced constitutional value worthy of special
judicial protection is a necessary but not sufficient predicate for a clear
statement rule. The second requirement for a clear statement rule is that
it must be consistent with legislative supremacy. An examination of the
application of waivers of sovereign immunity in two environmental
statutes demonstrates that while Congress can easily write a statute that
waives sovereign immunity, Congress has far more difficulty writing a
waiver of sovereign immunity that targets a particular situation ahead of
time. The inability of Congress to satisfy a clear statement rule even
when it is focusing on the issue shows that such a rule violates legislative
supremacy.
1. INTERPRETIVE REGIMES, LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY, AND CLEAR
STATEMENT RULES
Clear statement rules can help Congress when it drafts legislation.
As Eskridge and Frickey have explained, clear statement rules (and other
canons) are designed "to create a predictable interpretive regime."z31
Such a regime contributes to the rule of law "by rendering statutory
interpretation more predictable, regular, and coherent."' Clear
statement rules also lower the legislature's cost of writing statutes by
providing gap-filling rules that the legislature knows ahead of time."
But clear statement rules can produce results contrary to legislative
intent. Congress faces both linguistic and institutional limits on its ability
to write legislation that accurately resolves future events. "Not only is it
too costly to address all foreseeable problems, but also some problems are
unforeseeable at the time the legislation is written." 8 Congress may
235. Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 86.
236. Id. at 66.
237. Id. These and other benefits of clear statement rules and all canons of
statutory interpretation are further discussed supra notes 145-162 and accompanying text.
238. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 137 (1994). The problems are detailed in Richard A. Posner,
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even intend that the courts resolve difficult, unexpected questions. 9
In such cases, the structure, history or purpose of a statute may provide
evidence of legislative intent when the text itself is ambiguous. Clear
statement rules ignore that evidence, and in doing so, they necessarily
produce results which do not reflect accurately the legislative intent
revealed by those sources. Indeed, a clear statement rule may produce a
result contrary to the better reading of the statutory text itself because the
existence of another, less plausible reading may create a fatal ambiguity
under a clear statement rule.2m
Perhaps a result inconsistent with legislative intent could be tolerated
when an unenforced constitutional provision is at stake. If the Court
decides not to enforce a constitutional norm through judicial review, it
may nonetheless want an assurance that Congress breached the norm
intentionally, not accidentally and without deliberation." The effect
is countermajoritarian because the congressional policy choice gives way
to the judicial policy choice, but two factors mitigate that effect. First,
the policy choice made by the judiciary springs from the Constitution, not
from the personal biases of the Court. Second, Congress can always
overcome the judicial standard by writing a statute that satisfies the
demands of the clear statement rule. Congress incurs a cost whenever it
is required to revisit a subject, and the imposition of a clear statement
rule fundamentally affects the bargaining power of the members of
Congress addressing the matter. Nonetheless, the admittedly imperfect
ability to overcome the Court's clear statement rule presents an alternative
Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
811 (1983); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982). For concerns about the
linguistic problems, see Jerry L. Marshaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 835 (1991) (suggesting
that clear statement rules "[dlescribe a disfunctionally [sic] 'acontextual' view of the
power of language").
239. Judge Easterbrook has written that
the 'clear statement' principle usually fails as a useful tool of construction
because it cannot demonstrate why the legislature would have wanted the court
to hesitate just because the subject matter of the law is 'sensitive.' Likely it
thinks that making hard decisions in sensitive areas is what courts are for.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 545 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
240. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text; see also William D. Popkin,
Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. L. 865, 881 (1993);
Shapiro, supra note 11, at 940.
241. See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 631; Shapiro,
supra note 11, at 959; Sunstein, supra note 144, at 458.
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that is not available to Congress when the Court strikes down a statute as
unconstitutional. 2
If Congress cannot readily satisfy a clear statement rule ex ante, then
the legislative supremacy barrier to such a rule becomes insuperable. A
clear statement rule demands that Congress state its intention with special
precision. Such rules are thus well suited for interpretive questions that
can be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." Does this statute apply
extraterritorially? Is the unconstitutional provision of this statute
severable from the remaining provisions of the statute? 2 3  Conversely,
interpretive questions that do not present two such sharp alternatives pose
problems for clear statement rules. Who is entitled to receive social
security disability benefits? Which parties are liable for hazardous waste
contamination? A clear statement rule that Congress must struggle to
satisfy even when it is focusing on the issue violates legislative
supremacy.
2. THE LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY EFFECTS OF A CLEAR STATEMENT
RULE FOR WAIVERS OF FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Congress knows how to waive federal sovereign immunity. But
there is a crucial difference between asking whether a statutory provision
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity in some instances and whether
that provision constitutes a waiver in a particular instance. The first
question is much more easily answered and much more likely to be the
subject of the kind of "yes/no" inquiry typical of clear statement rules.
But if the answer is "yes," the additional question of the scope of the
242. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 1065; Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement,
supra note 11, at 631; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 959.
243. I have previously suggested that a clear statement rule should govern the
severability of unconstitutional statutes. See Nagle, supra note 133, at 254-56. To the
extent that my earlier severability proposal is inconsistent with the general theory of clear
statement rules developed here, I have also explained that the ideal solution would be for
the legislature itself to establish a clear statement rule for severability. Id. at 256-58; see
also Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. LEOis. 211,
221 (1994) ("[legislators might want to create their own clear statement rules so that
courts will not mistakenly decide that the legislature intended to take certain actions").
Alternately, "[liegislators also might forbid courts to use clear statement rules. . . .If
legislators disliked these added burdens or their unexpected retroactive application, they
could pass interpretive laws forbidding clear statement rules in some or all areas." Id.
at 221; see also Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 566 (1992) ("The only
way for Congress to prevent the continued use of normative canons with which it
disagrees is to enact an amendment to Title I of the United States Code that expressly
provides for different rules of construction.") (footnote omitted).
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waiver and its application to particular controversies is much more
difficult to determine. And it is that question which has generated the
recent litigation regarding waivers of sovereign immunity. These recent
cases suggest that Congress struggles to specify the scope of a waiver of
sovereign immunity, thus raising serious legislative supremacy concerns
about a rule requiring a clear statement of the scope of the waiver.
Two environmental law examples illustrate the point. Most of the
primary federal environmental statutes share the same general purpose:
to treat polluting federal facilities the same as polluting private
facilities.' This purpose is evident in the waiver provisions that
Congress has written with increasing breadth.4 5 The scope of those
waivers, however, has proved difficult to determine.' The first
historical example of that difficulty concerns the evolution of the waivers
of sovereign immunity in the Clean Water Act, the Clear Air Act, and
RCRA, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio and the
congressional reversal of part of that decision. The second example
concerns ongoing litigation about the scope of the waiver of sovereign
immunity in the Comprehensive Environmental Restoration, Cleanup and
Liability Act (CERCLA). Both examples demonstrate the difficulty in
writing a waiver of sovereign immunity that achieves all of the results that
Congress intends.
3. THE LESSONS OF OHIO
As explained more fully by others,7" the Clean Water Act and the
244. See, e.g., Murchison, supra note 132, at 223; Percival, supra note 132, at
223.
245. Murchison attributes the breadth of particular statutory waivers to the date
on which they were enacted, rather than a judgment about the type of waiver appropriate
for the particular statute. See Murchison, supra note 132, at 210-11; see also Percival,
supra note 132, at 254-55 (agreeing with Murchison).
246. The qualifying language in the environmental waivers is emphasized in Yates,
supra note 132, at 183, 186, and Tucker, supra note 29, at 94. The environmental
statutes also empower the President to exempt projects from the substantive environmental
requirements in special circumstances. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994) (authorizing
presidential exemption from Clean Water Act if "in the paramount interest of the United
States"). See generally David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things?:
Dismantling Excess Weapons While Protecting the Environment, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 445,
512-13 (1995) (arguing that presidential exemption provisions should not apply to
requirements imposed by arms control treaties); Tucker, supra note 29, at 101-06
(describing the limited experience with the exemption provisions).
247. The story is told by Murchison, supra note 132, at 180-201; Kenneth M.
Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes, 62
VA. L. REv. 1177 (1976); Percival, supra note 132, at 222-32, 237-53; Tucker, supra
note 29, at 88-93, 96-98; Cary, supra note 132, at 806-20; Gleason & Goutzounis, supra
Clear Statement Rules
Clean Air Act initially obligated federal agencies to simply cooperate with
state and local pollution control agencies if possible." s  The
environmental problems at federal facilities persisted, so when Congress
greatly strengthened the federal environmental laws beginning in 1970, it
generally directed federal agencies to adhere to the same pollution control
standards that private parties had to satisfy. The Clean Air Act, for
example, required federal agencies to "comply with federal, state,
interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of air
pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements."' At the same time, and for the first time, Congress
authorized citizens to bring suit against federal agencies to enforce those
commands.2'
Federal agencies reacted by arguing that the new laws required them
to comply with the substantive requirements of state pollution laws, but
not the procedural requirements of those state laws. So viewed, federal
agencies were not required to obtain state permits. The federal agencies
based their argument on sovereign immunity, especially the doctrine that
waivers of immunity must be construed narrowly. In Hancock v.
Train"' and EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board,2 the Supreme Court agreed. Looking for a "clear and
unambiguous" waiver, the Court concluded that the provision requiring
compliance with "Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements
respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that
any person is subject to such requirements" applied only to substantive
requirements because it failed to provide that federal agencies must
comply with "all" state requirements. 3 The Court reminded Congress.
note 132, at 298-305; Heintz, supra note 132, at 274-76; Rothmel, supra note 27, at 586-
98; Yates, supra note 132, at 187-89, 193-205.
248. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 86-365, § 2, 73 Stat. 646 (1959); Water
Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-660, § 9, 70 Stat. 498, 506 (1956) (federal
agencies shall cooperate with state agencies "insofar as practicable and consistent with the
interests of the United States and within any available appropriations").
249. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676,
1689 (1970). Other federal environmental statutes of that era contained similar language.
See Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974); Noise
Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 4, 86 Stat. 1234, 1235 (1972); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 875 (1972).
250. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972);
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706
(1970).
251. 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (Clean Air Act).
252. 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (Clean Water Act).
253. See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 179, 182-87; California, 426 U.S. at 211, 221-26.
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that Congress could rewrite the waivers if that was what Congress
intended.'
Congress rewrote the waivers. First, it added the word "all" before
"requirements" in the federal facility provision of the new RCRA.'5
And, for good measure, Congress specified that federal agencies would
no longer be immune "from any process or sanction of any State or
Federal Court with respect to the enforcement of such injunctive
relief."' Next, Congress made similar changes to the Clean Water
Act and the Clean Air Act." The purpose of these amendments, as
stated in the legislative history, was to correct the Court's
misinterpretation of congressional intent in Hancock and California and
"to settle these matters once and for all.""-s
But that did not work either. Federal agencies insisted that while
they were now obligated to comply with the substantive and procedural
requirements of state pollution laws, they were not subject to civil
penalties for violations of those laws. That argument failed in the lower
courts under the Clean Air Act, and it met with mixed results under the
254. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 200.
255. Pub. L. No. 95-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2821 (1976).
256. Id.
257. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 60(b)(2), 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566,
1597-98 (1977); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91
Stat. 1399 (1977); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116(b), 91 Stat. 685, 711 (1977).
The Clean Water Act included the qualification that "the United States shall be liable only
for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by State or local court to
enforce an order or the process of such court." 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2) (1994). See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
258. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4371-75, 4392; H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1089-90; H.R. REP. No. 240,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1276-78.
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Clean Water Act and RCRA.5 9  The argument finally succeeded in
Ohio.2
Congress rewrote the waiver again. Four months after Ohio,
Congress amended RCRA to explicitly waive sovereign immunity from
civil penalties for violating state hazardous waste laws."1 Congress
indicated that it had intended this result all along.2 But Congress has
not been so fast to change the Clean Water Act. Several proposed
amendments have been introduced since Ohio, but none have been
enacted.' For now, the Court's decision in Ohio that civil penalties
259. The lower courts divided on the Clean Water Act. Compare Sierra Club v.
Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991) (waiver), rev'd, 504 U.S. 902 (1992) with
California v. United States Dep't of Navy, 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988) (no waiver); and
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. I11. 1990) (same) and
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal.
1986) (same). On RCRA, compare Maine v. United States Dep't of Navy, 702 F. Supp.
322 (D. Me. 1988) (waiver), vacated, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992) with Mitzelfelt v.
Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990) (no waiver) and United States
v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989) (same) and Meyer v. United States Coast
Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (same). Three district courts held that the
Clean Air Act waived sovereign immunity from civil penalties. See United States v. Air
Pollution Control Bd., No. 3:88-1030, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18996 (M.D. Tenn. Feb.
28, 1990); Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans' Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D.
Ala. 1986); Ohio ex rel. Celebreeze v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210 (S.D. Ohio 1987). Each court relied on a clear statement
to that effect in the legislative history of the Clean Air Act. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1089-90. Nordic
Village calls those decisions into question. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 37 (1992) (legislative history cannot be used to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity); see also Cary, supra note 132, at 822-24 (noting that the Clean Air Act cases
would probably be decided differently under Nordic Village).
260. 503 U.S. 607 (1992); see supra part II.B.3.
261. The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and procedural
requirements referred to in this subsection include, but are not limited to, all
administrative orders and all civil and administrative penalties and fines,
regardless of whether such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature
or are imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations.
Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(a)(3), 106 Stat.
1505 (1992).
262. The conference committee report stated that the purpose of the changes was
to reverse Ohio and "reaffirm the original intent of Congress that each department,
agency, and instrumentality of the United States be subject to all of the provisions" of
hazardous waste laws. 138 CONO. REC. H8864 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992). Percival
collects the similar statements of individual legislators. See Percival, supra note 119, at
245-46 & nn.143-44.
263. See H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a) (1995) (amending § 313 of
the Clean Water Act to provide that "the United States hereby expressly waives any
immunity otherwise applicable to the United States . . . including . . . any civil or
administrative penalty or fine"); H.R. 340, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 139 CONG.
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are unavailable against federal agencies under the Clean Water Act still
stands.
One can view this history in three different ways. The first view is
that the process worked. The second view is that the process most
definitely did not work, and the saga demonstrates broader problems with
the Court's statutory interpretation jurisprudence. The third view is that
the clear statement rule inevitably frustrated the achievement of the
congressional goals, but that a less drastic solution is available and
desirable. These three views of these cases teach three different lessons.
Lesson # 1: Congress can specify precisely which activities are no
longer protected by sovereign immunity, and the courts will give those
decisions effect. If the courts wrongly interpret Congress' intentions,
Congress can correct the misinterpretations. Indeed, such statutory
responses to judicial decisions may become more common now that the
House has instituted a regular "Corrections Day" to fix statutory
mistakes.' Ohio then may be an example of the kind of helpful
dialogue to which Congress and the courts should both aspire.'
If you believe that the Court misinterpreted Congress's intent at each
step, as Congress repeatedly protested,' then a different picture
emerges. In the environmental cases, it took over twenty years for the
courts to give effect to what Congress intended all along. That gives one
pause, especially when the institutional costs of requiring Congress to
revisit a problem it thought it had solved are added to the equation. 7
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the 1970 Congress could have written
the statutory provision necessary to produce a waiver in Ohio. Congress
would have had to anticipate that civil penalties would become a future
REc. E1720-02 (1993) (statement of Rep. DeFazio) (introducing the Federal Facilities
Clean Water Compliance Act).
264. For a description of the House's procedure and the issues it raises, see John
Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming June 1996).
265. See generally Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the
Relationship, 52 OHio ST. L.J. 279 (1991).
266. See supra note 262. These claims probably should be taken with a grain of
salt. In any event, I do not question the consistent rejection of subsequent legislative
history as evidence of what Congress meant in the first instance. See, e.g., United States
v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1635 n.4 (1993) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)); Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers,
Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir.
1990).
267. See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 11, at 66; Eskridge
& Frickey, Clear Statement, supra note 11, at 639; Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in
Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 51 (1993); Shapiro, supra note 11, at 959;
Note, supra note 238, at 905-06. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
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issue. The one-issue-at-a-time approach that flows from the Court's clear
statement rule is less than satisfactory.
Lesson # 2: The second possible lesson of this history sees Ohio as
symptomatic of a broader flaw in the Court's statutory interpretation
jurisprudence. The critics of Ohio view the decision as "formalistic," and
they advocate a more liberal rule for interpreting waivers of sovereign
immunity in the environmental context and beyond.'
Both the diagnosis and the prescription are problematic. The
problem is not a "formalistic" interpretive approach. Indeed, the Court's
error may be in spending too little time looking at the statutory language,
not too much. Clear statement rules are less concerned about what the
statutory text says than what it does not say. They are indifferent about
the meaning of the statutory text provided that it does not say "this statute
applies extraterritorially" or "the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
states is waived in situations x, y, and z." Ohio and Nordic Village
provide particularly striking illustrations of a clear statement rule's
disinterest in the meaning of the statutory text. In each case, the Court
described alternative interpretations of the statutes, but it made no effort
to ascertain which interpretation was better.' Most originalist
approaches to statutory interpretation, including the plain meaning rule
and other "formalistic" approaches, would have actively sought to learn
what the statute means.270
268. See Murchison, supra note 132, at 210; Percival, supra note 132, at 221.
Murchison finds the strict construction rule acceptable in other situations, but not in the
environmental context. Murchison, supra note 132, at 206-07. He endorses a functional
approach for judicial interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity that emphasizes the
statutory text and the legislative purpose, but avoids the legislative history and canons.
Id. at 210-12, 223-26. Additionally, Murchison proposes a legislative directive to read
waivers of sovereign immunity in environmental statutes liberally. Id.; see also Cary,
supra note 132, at 840 (endorsing Murchison's proposal). Murchison further favors
replacing the series of individual waivers with a general environmental waiver provision
containing exceptions as needed. Murchison, supra note 132, at 207-08. 1 explain why
a special rule for waivers in environmental statutes is unnecessary infra part Ill.B.4.
Percival would limit the strict construction rule even further. Relying on Sunstein,
Percival argues that the strict construction rule should be limited to private law, and not
extended to public law. Percival, supra note 132, at 253. He admits that requiring a
clear statement is "a laudable goal," but the cost of delaying federal facility compliance
with environmental standards is too high. Id. at 254. He advocates an interpretive rule
presuming that a waiver takes place absent a contrary clear congressional intent. Id. at
255-56. But Percival's reliance on the list of values Sunstein wants to protect is
problematic, as I have already explained. See supra notes 168-179 and accompanying
text.
269. See supra notes 53-64, 72-75 and accompanying text.
270. Or meant to the legislature or should mean now-the differences are real but
irrelevant to my point here.
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Further, the case for a special rule for waivers of sovereign
immunity in the environmental context is unconvincing. Strong
arguments exist for permitting the federal government to be sued for its
own environmental violations-but they do not seem stronger than the
arguments for permitting the government to pay its way in state water law
adjudications (as in Idaho) or to pay tort judgments (as in Smith) or to be
treated like any other creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding (as in Nordic
Village). Moreover, Krent's theory of sovereign immunity shows that
arguments about the need for a waiver of sovereign immunity should be
directed to Congress so that it can balance the injuries caused by special
treatment for the government with the interference in government
policymaking that immunity is designed to prevent.2 7 Once Congress
has done so, then the task of the courts is to ascertain Congress's intent.
Lesson # 3: Ohio offers a third lesson. The courts rightly focus on
the statutory text to find a waiver of sovereign immunity, as they do to
answer most other interpretive questions. The benefits of encouraging
Congress to specify its waiver decision in the statutory text include: (1)
the notice provided to federal agencies and individuals affected by
government conduct; (2) the assurance that Congress specifically
considered the matter; (3) satisfaction of the Article I bicameralism and
presentment requirements governing the creation of federal law; (4) the
electoral accountability of representatives who voted for or against certain
statutory language; and (5) the legislative supremacy value of faithfulness
to the statutory text.27 But a clear statement rule is not needed to
achieve the first two benefits so long as the courts still emphasize the
primacy of the statutory text. And a clear statement rule actually
disserves legislative supremacy if Congress must struggle to write a
statutory provision that satisfies such a rule.2"
The manner in which a waiver of sovereign immunity is interpreted
thus should depend on the manner in which it is written. Some waivers
are broad, others are narrow. Thus, the explanation for reading
environmental waivers more broadly lies in the broad language of those
statutes, not in any unique characteristics of environmental law. Further,
when the statutory text is unclear, general principles of statutory
construction direct the interpreter to secondary sources to ascertain what
Congress meant. That is the step a clear statement rule prohibits, but it
is precisely the step needed to fulfill the obligation to remain faithful to
271. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
272. These points are made in Murchison, supra note 132, at 224; Redish &
Chung, supra note 142, at 862; Sunstein, supra note 144, at 416.
273. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 926. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
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the immunity decision Congress made. For example, Ardestani prohibits
reliance on a statute's purpose to demonstrate a waiver of sovereign
immunity, 4 while many commentators have urged that ambiguous
statutory waivers should be interpreted consistent with the purpose of the
statute. 2" 5
This approach raises questions about the result in Ohio. The Court
found the Clean Water Act ambiguous because it was susceptible to a
reading that Congress had not waived immunity from civil penalties
imposed for punitive reasons. That reading, however, violated another
of the Court's established canons of statutory construction: a statute
should not be read in a manner that renders part of the statute
superfluous. 76 As such, that reading should have been rejected. The
government still may have been able to provide an alternative reading in
support of its position that would have yielded an ambiguity, but unless
the government did so, the Court should have concluded that the statutory
language could bear only the reading that resulted in a waiver. So
viewed, Ohio may be no more than an instance of improperly applying
the correct test.2"
The focus on statutory language also eliminates the need for a special
rule for "sue and be sued" clauses. The Court follows the precise
opposite presumption when reading "sue and be sued" clauses: it reads
them as waiving sovereign immunity in all instances unless there is a
compelling justification for a narrower reading." The different rules
produce strange results when both types of waivers are present. For
example, although Ohio established that the Clean Water Act does not
subject federal agencies to civil penalties, the United States Postal Service
must pay such penalties because it may "sue and be sued.""'
Moreover, the dramatically different rules are hard to explain when
looking at the statutory text. A congressional directive that a federal
instrumentality can "sue and be sued" seems no broader than a command
274. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
275. See Murchison, supra note 132, at 212, 226; Percival, supra note 132, at
256; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 940; Note, supra note 238, at 906.
276. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
277. That was Justice White's dissenting view. United States Dep't of Energy v.
Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 631-37 (1992); see also Gleason & Goutzounis, supra note 132, at
294 (arguing that the Court used the right test but applied it improperly). Given that Ohio
was the only recent decision that provoked Justice White to dissent, and remembering that
he wrote the decisions in Hancock and California, his position is noteworthy. Murchison,
however, views the Clean Water Act as the "most unclear statute" regarding permissible
sanctions. Murchison, supra note 132, at 221.
278. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.




that a federal agency shall be subject to all laws in the same manner and
to the same extent as a nongovernmental entity. The "sue and be sued"
language may have a slight edge for being unqualified, but the precision
of the latter waivers suggests that Congress actually gave more thought
to all of the ramifications of a waiver of sovereign immunity. The
current clear statement rule and opposite presumption for "sue and be
sued" clauses misses all of these nuances.
4. THE LESSONS OF CERCLA
The second example involves the scope of a waiver of sovereign
immunity that the Supreme Court has never considered. The
Comprehensive Environmental Restoration, Cleanup and Liability Act
(CERCLA) imposes liability on nongovernmental parties in four
instances: (1) they are the current owner or operator of a facility where
there has been a release or threatened release of hazardous substances; (2)
they were the owner or operator of such a facility at the time of the
disposal of the hazardous substances ("owners" and "operators"); (3) they
arranged to dispose of the hazardous substances at the site ("arrangers"
or "generators"); or (4) they transported the hazardous substances to the
site ("transporters").' Section 120 of CERCLA provides that the
federal government shall be liable "in the same manner and to the same
extent as any nongovernmental entity."2"1 That directive seems clear
in situations involving a federal government facility such as a military
base or nuclear waste disposal site where the government disposed
hazardous substances. But where the government engages in activities
that lack such a clear private counterpart, the application of the waiver is
less clear. Ongoing litigation over government involvement in wartime
industrial activities illustrates the interpretive difficulty.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). 1 described CERCLA's liability scheme in more
detail in John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MNN. L.
REv. 1493, 1504-16 (1994).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1994). Waivers in other statutes use nearly identical
language. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) (states subject to copyright laws); 42
U.S.C. § 300j-6(a) (1994) (federal agencies subject to safe drinking water requirements);
42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994) (federal agencies subject to Clean Air Act); see also
Murchison, supra note 132, at 203 nn. 178-79 (citing statutes); Rothmel, supra note, 27,
at 609 (same). For examples of cases interpreting CERCLA's other waiver of sovereign
immunity from state laws, see Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp.
224 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (waiver of sovereign immunity in CERCLA § 120(a)(4) does not
extend to facilities no longer owned or operated by the federal government); United States
v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 778 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-32 (M.D. Pa. 1991)
(waiver of sovereign immunity in CERCLA § 120(a)(4) extends to federal liability under
state hazardous waste statute).
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Historically, the federal government has had an altogether different
relationship with the private industrial economy during times of war than
during times of peace. This was most true during World War II, but also
was evident during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and even during
the Cold War period of the 1950s. During World War II, for example,
the government controlled wages and prices, coordinated industrial output
to assure that goods needed for the war effort were being produced, and
retained the ultimate power to seize a private industrial plant that failed
to produce adequately. With few exceptions, however, industrial
production remained in private hands.
Fifty years later, we know that the industrial processes of the 1940s
generated hazardous wastes that are causing environmental problems
today. The companies that were involved in wartime industrial
production are plainly liable under CERCLA as past owners, operators,
and generators of hazardous substances. Likewise, the current owners
and operators of those facilities are liable under CERCLA even if they
had no involvement at the site during the war when the contamination
occurred. Both groups of private companies are pointing to the
government as the true responsible party, and specifically, as a past
"operator" of facilities by virtue of the extensive government involvement
in the manufacturing enterprise during World War II.
FMC Corporation v. United States Department of Commerce2"
held that CERCLA's waiver of sovereign immunity extends to such
claims. The situation in FMC is typical: the government contracted with
a private company to produce high tenacity rayon needed as a synthetic
substitute for rubber supplies controlled by the Japanese. The government
engaged in a broad variety of activities to support the company's efforts,
but the company retained control of its plant.2 When EPA ordered
FMC, a past owner of the site, to clean up the contamination resulting
from the wartime manufacturing processes fifty years before, FMC sued
the government alleging that the government was an "operator" and
"arranger" based on its activities during the war. The government
responded that CERCLA's waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply
to government activities with no private counterpart, such as regulatory
activities incident to the prosecution of the war.
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held eight to four that the
government had waived its sovereign immunity and was liable as an
operator.2  The majority acknowledged that waivers of sovereign
282. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane), aff'g 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa.
1992).
283. The court's opinion describes the facts in more detail. Id. at 835-38.
284. id. at 838-45. The court split six to six on the government's liability as an
arranger, thereby affirming without the district court's holding that the government was
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immunity must be narrowly construed, but it made no mention of the
clear statement rule implicit in Ardestani, Nordic Village, and Ohio.20
That omission was telling, for the majority's reasoning contradicts the
teaching of each of those cases. The majority read the waiver to mean
that "when the government engages in activities that would make a private
party liable if the private party engaged in those types of activities, then
the government also is liable."' CERCLA's language permits the
majority's interpretation, but it is hard to insist that CERCLA only can
be interpreted in that fashion. The government proffered an alternative
interpretation: CERCLA waives immunity when the government "is
acting or has acted like a 'nongovernmental entity,' such as by owning
facilities, but not when it is conducting a sovereign's purely regulatory
actions in connection with the operations of a private, for-profit
entity." 287  Under Ohio, the existence of two plausible interpretations
of the statute dooms the case for a waiver.288 Similarly, the majority
emphasized that CERCLA is a remedial statute that should be read
broadly to achieve its purposes.289 Ardestani teaches that the purpose
of a statute is irrelevant in the search for a waiver, remedial or not.
liable as an arranger. Id. at 845-46; see also id. at 854 n.7 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
285. The majority stated the strict construction rule applied by the Supreme Court
before 1991, though it cited Meyer with a "but see" without elaboration. Id. at 839. The
majority also justified its conclusion as "consistent with our approach to statutory
construction in general, and to CERCLA in particular, which is to read plain language to
mean what it says." Id. at 840. That is a different question than whether the statute
contains a clear statement waiving sovereign immunity. Actually, the majority's best
argument rested on stare decisis. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), held that nearly identical language in the FTCA waived sovereign immunity with
respect to the government's negligent operation of a lighthouse. The majority found
Indian Towing controlling, see FMC, 29 F.3d at 840, and Judge Stapleton believed that
Indian Towing supported the majority's conclusion regarding sovereign immunity even
though he disagreed with the majority's ensuing holding that the federal government was
an "operator" of the site for purposes of CERCLA. id. at 854 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
286. FMC, 29 F.3d at 840. The majority added that "[t]his is true even if no
private party could in fact engage in those specific activities." Id. Thus, the government
could be required to clean up a military base even though no private party could operate
a military base. This analysis is flawed. As the dissent responded, "[tihat construction
of the statute is illogical, not much different than saying that birds are required to have
passports to fly across the borders of nations that require people to have passports." Id.
at 847 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 847 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
288. Ohio, Nordic Village, and Idaho all teach that the existence of two plausible
interpretations of a statute prevents finding a waiver of sovereign immunity in that statute.
See supra at part II.B.3-5. Chief Judge Sloviter relied on this principle in dissent. FMC,
29 F.3d at 847; see also Van S. Katzman, Note, The Waste of War: Government CERCLA
Liability at World War 11 Facilities, 79 VA. L. REV. 1191, 1205-06 & n.4 (1993).
289. FMC, 29 F.3d at 840-41.
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Finally, and contrary to Nordic Village, the majority relied on a statement
in the legislative history to inform its understanding of the purpose of the
statute. °
FMC is thus wrongly decided under a clear statement rule for
waivers of sovereign immunity. But absent such a rule, the case becomes
more difficult. CERCLA was enacted by a lame-duck Congress in
December 1980 after President Reagan and a Republican Senate were
elected but before they took office. The resulting legislative compromise
produced much ambiguous language and little helpful legislative
history.9" CERCLA is designed to make "polluters pay" and to
identify as many polluters as possible,' and that statutory purpose
supports the FMC majority's conclusion that holding the government
liable is consistent with the law. On the other hand, the government
sometimes acts in fundamentally different ways than private entities, even
when the government is involved in the marketplace. The clear statement
rule skips these difficult interpretive issues because CERCLA does not say
"the government has waived its sovereign immunity from claims for
assisting industrial activities during the war."'
One concern remains. The Ohio and CERCLA examples
demonstrate the difficulty of crafting a waiver that will cover all of the
situations Congress wants to address. Writing a waiver is easy; writing
a waiver of a particular scope is hard. But it may be no more difficult to
define the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity than it is to define the
scope of other statutes that are subject to clear statement rules. For
example, Congress must state clearly that a statute applies
290. Id. The majority resisted the temptation to quote Senator Stafford's 1986
criticism of federal facility compliance with CERCLA that "no loophole, it seems, is too
small to be found by the Federal Government." 3 SENATE COMM. ON ENVTL. & PUB.
WORKS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION
ACT OF 1986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5177 (1990).
291. See Nagle, supra note 280, at 1494 & n.6.
292. See id. at 1493 & n.2.
293. The Clinton Administration's CERCLA reform proposal proceeds from the
exact opposite direction. Faced with litigants and the FMC court who read the current
CERCLA waiver of sovereign immunity as extending to government wartime activities,
the Administration's proposed legislation specifically exempts such activities from the
general waiver of sovereign immunity. See Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(d) (1994); see also 140 CONG. REC. 51081 (1994) (describing
Administration proposal). The result is akin to the law governing that "sue and be sued"
sovereign immunity is presumed waived unless Congress specifically says otherwise. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1441 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (reading § 120 of CERCLAto waive the




extraterritorially.' Surely Congress does not need to state "section 1
of this Act applies to conduct occurring in Armenia, Australia, Austria.
• .," "section 2 of this Act applies to conduct occurring . . . ." The
requirement of clear statement is not one of a'particular formula. But
suppose an American corporation doing business in Saudi Arabia faces
local opposition to its employment of women. Although Title VII states
that "it shall apply extraterritorially,"' 5 the corporation argues that the
statute does not apply because Congress failed to clearly state that Title
VII applies in countries that view sex discrimination in a much different
light. The broad language should suffice even though Congress did not
list the specific situations in which it could apply. If that is so, then
perhaps the difficulty in ascertaining the scope of a waiver of sovereign
immunity is unique. If not, and if Congress cannot simply say "this
statute applies extraterritorially," then the case for other clear statement
rules suffers as well.
The legislative supremacy concern becomes even greater when
Congress routinely displays less concern for the value the courts are so
eager to protect with a clear statement rule. Sovereign immunity seems
to be such a case. Congress has waived federal sovereign immunity in a
wide range of areas.' Many state legislatures have enacted statutes
repudiating the strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity.'
The Supreme Court justified the liberal construction rule it applied in the
1940s by reference to the increasing trend toward waiving sovereign
immunity.."' Congress alone, however, cannot dictate the importance
of the value to be protected by a clear statement rule. Reliance on
congressional attitudes is especially suspect when the separation of powers
is at issue because Congress by definition has a different institutional
interest than the courts or the executive. But legislative supremacy
suffers when Congress repeatedly works to achieve a result within its
constitutional power, only to have the Court employ an interpretive rule
that causes each effort to fail.
294. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
295. This is a hypothetical. See id. (holding that Title VII does not apply
extraterritorially).
296. For lists of statutes waiving sovereign immunity, see United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 n.8 (1951); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 762 (1st
Cir. 1994); Heintz, supra note 132, at 271.
297. See generally 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.04 (5th ed. 1992) (citing state statutes).
298. See Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("courts reflect a strong legislative momentum in their
tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government"); United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 495, 501 (1940) ("A sense of justice has brought a progressive relaxation by
legislative enactments of the rigor of the immunity rule.").
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C. A Presumption of Sovereign Immunity
The two questions examined above advise against a rule requiring a
clear statement of the scope of the waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
The constitutional separation of powers may be characterized as a
constitutional norm that the Court deliberately underenforces, but both
that characterization and the assertion that sovereign immunity rests on
the separation of powers are problematic. Even if sovereign immunity
passes that hurdle, writing a waiver of sovereign immunity that satisfies
a clear statement rule is a daunting task, so a clear statement rule for
interpreting the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity threatens
legislative supremacy.
A weaker presumption respecting sovereign immunity would be more
appropriate. Krent suggests in passing that "[i]t may be that our system,
at least in the torts context, would benefit if Congress were required
affirmatively to legislate immunity, instead of enjoying immunity as a
default rule."' The better course, however, would be a presumption
that sovereign immunity has not been waived.' A presumption that
sovereign immunity has been waived conflicts with the historic context in
which Congress has written waivers of sovereign immunity and upon
which federal agencies and others have relied. Justice Breyer has
questioned the Court's authority to establish a rule that breaks so sharply
from the past."0  By contrast, a presumption against a waiver of
sovereign immunity would give weight to the values protected by
sovereign immunity. It would protect the separation of powers from
unintended judicial interference, while permitting Congress to waive
immunity whenever it desires. It would recognize that favoring continuity
"is one of the major tasks of the judiciary in our complex
democracy."' It would also permit a court to examine more closely
cases where the statutory language is ambiguous but where there is other
evidence of what Congress meant. In effect, a presumption would
operate like the rule that the Court applied before it began to create a
clear statement rule in 1991.
299. Krent, supra note 24 at 1531 n.7.
300. Whether such a presumption should impose a burden of persuasion, a burden
of proof, or simply operate as a tiebreaker or in some other fashion need not be resolved
here. The point is simply that there is another way to protect the values inherent in
sovereign immunity besides the establishment of a clear statement rule.
301. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 870 (1992).




The case for a clear statement rule for waivers of sovereign
immunity snaps from the tension between the goals of a clear statement
rule and the goals of the Court's typical originalist approach to statutory
construction. Usually the Court tries to determine what Congress meant
by particular statutory language, and if the examination of the text itself
comes up short, the Court turns elsewhere for help. Clear statement rules
are always in tension with this approach because they begin the
examination of the statutory language with a skeptical eye and they refuse
to look elsewhere if the text does not overcome that skepticism. When
the reasons for the skepticism are strong-when the values protected by
a clear statement rule derive from the Constitution and are deliberately
underenforced by the Court-and when Congress can easily write a
waiver that overcomes the Court's skepticism, then the case for a clear
statement rule is strongest. When the values at stake are less weighty or
Congress must struggle to accomplish the result it desires, a clear
statement rule is inappropriate.
Waivers of federal sovereign immunity fall in the latter category.
The separation of powers values inherent in sovereign immunity may
deserve special protection. Yet the very justification for sovereign
immunity points toward an interpretive framework that focuses on the
statutory text, and secondary sources if necessary, to ascertain the
decision Congress made. And while it is not difficult to determine
whether a statutory provision waives sovereign immunity generally, the
scope of a statutory waiver as applied to particular claims presents a much
harder question. The answer lies in the Court's general approach to
determining Congress's intent, aided by a presumption against a waiver,
but not the clear statement rule fashioned by the Court.
